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Abstract 
 
This project aims to determine whether it is possible to identify indications of an emerging 
international norm of humanitarian intervention, in cases of mass atrocities. This is examined 
through an English School understanding of the concepts of norms and institutions, as well as the 
conflicting positions between state sovereignty and human justice. The project examines the 
emergence of the Responsibility to Protect as a norm and its operationalization in the case of the 
mass atrocities in Darfur.  
It is concluded that while there are indications of an emerging norm of the Responsibility to Protect 
rhetorically, the rhetoric surrounding it still differs from the international willingness to 
operationalize it. It is further concluded that due to a series of compromises made in order to unite 
the different state types behind the endorsement of the norm, the Responsibility to Protect entails a 
high level of indeterminacy, which hampers the result of the operationalization.  
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ACRONYMS 
 
AMIS  African Union Mission in Sudan 
AU African Union 
AUSC African Union Security Council 
ES  English School 
ICC  International Criminal Court 
ICG  International Crisis Group 
ICISS  International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
IR  International Relations 
RtoP  Responsibility to Protect 
UN United Nations 
UNAMID  United Nations / African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur 
UNSC  United Nations Security Council  
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1. Introduction 
Nearly 60 years after the Holocaust it seems that the international society has yet to agree to a 
strategy of preventing and ending cases of mass atrocities1, and in relation to this still struggles to 
find a joint course to take on the question of human rights versus state sovereignty (Bellamy, 2009:1).  
In his 2000 Millennium Report, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, posed the question: “If 
humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond 
to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every 
precept of our common humanity?” (Annan 2000:48). With this question Kofi Annan triggered an 
open debate concerning the dilemma of what to prioritize higher, state sovereignty or protection of 
human rights through humanitarian intervention.  
To this day, the question of sovereignty versus protection of human rights continuously fosters 
debates and division within the international society, as well as within the academic field of 
international relations. Most recent example of the ubiquity and continuing relevance of the debate 
was when American President Barack Obama gave a speech at the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum where he said, “Remembrance without resolve is a hollow gesture. Awareness 
without action changes nothing. In this sense, 'never again' is a challenge to us all – to pause and to 
look within.” (23rd of April 2012).  
 
In 2001 The International Commission on State Sovereignty published the report “The 
Responsibility to Protect” – commonly known as the RtoP. The RtoP was introduced as an 
“international security and human rights norm to address the international community’s failure to 
prevent and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (ICRtoP). 
1.1 The ICISS Report and ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ 
The ICISS report called upon the international society to, through the UN Security Council, carry 
out the responsibility of protecting all peoples against mass atrocities when domestic governments 
fail in doing so. The concept further encouraged the international society to take “collective action” 
when peaceful means of ending conflict prove insufficient (Bannon, 2006: 1157). At the same time as 
encouraging the international society to react to cases of mass atrocities and human rights 
                                                        
1 “Mass atrocities” are in this project defined as: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. This definition is the same that is used in The Responsibility to Protect 
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violations, the ICISS report also introduces state sovereignty as a responsibility more than a right; a 
responsibility of sovereign states to protect its people.  
The commission found that using the language of previous debates on this issue would be a 
hindrance in the attempt to provide new perspectives on the on-going debate (ICISS 2011:11-12). As a 
consequence of this, the report was titled  “The Responsibility to Protect” instead of “The Right to 
Intervene”, a title that was inspired by Francis M. Deng’s book, “Sovereignty as Responsibility”, 
published in 1996 (Weiss, 2007: 89); the hope was that naming the report “The Responsibility to 
Protect” – from now on referred to as the RtoP – would put focus on those in need of protection 
instead of on those considering intervention.  
The RtoP ICISS report rests on three ‘pillars’:  
1) The Responsibility to Prevent, which aims to “address both the root causes and directs causes of 
internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk (…)” and which “is the 
single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect” (ICISS 2001:XI) 
 2) The Responsibility to React, which implies responding to “situations of compelling human need 
with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international 
prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention” (Ibid).  
3) The Responsibility to Rebuild, which entails the responsibility “to provide, particularly after a 
military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing 
the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.” (Ibid)  
 
These responsibilities lie, according to the report, first and foremost with the sovereign state, 
secondly with partnerships consisting of domestic authorities and external actors, and only thirdly 
with the international organizations and collaborations mechanisms (ICISS 2001:6.11). 
 
The first pillar and the fundament of the ICISS report is thus based on an understanding of the state 
as the primary protector of its people and sovereignty as the organizing principle of international 
society. Behind this understanding is a view on the institution of sovereignty, which stems back 
from the Peace of Westphalia in the year of 16482, where sovereign, territorial boarders became a 
natural right for the Western nation-states, just as the wellbeing of the peoples was now the 
responsibility solely of the individual states. The Peace of Westphalia laid the ground for the 
                                                        
2 The peace of Westphalia was the result of the first modern diplomatic congress. It initiated a new peace order in Central Europe 
basing on the nation-state sovereignty  
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common understanding of what constituted sovereignty and national responsibility. However, the 
end of the Cold War has since commonly been perceived as constituting a ‘shift’ in world order; 
entailing a development in the Western perceptions of statehood and state sovereignty, and an 
increased focus on and belief in human rights, good and transnational governance, progress through 
international cooperation etc.; the beginning of the 1990s were thus characterized by great optimism 
and belief in progress within the international society – not least in and through the UN.  
However, there seemed to still be a lack of general consensus about the definite superiority of this 
Western democratic liberal worldview on ‘The End of History’. The 1990s were marked by grave 
humanitarian conflicts as the genocides that were conducted during the Yugoslavian civil war and 
the genocide in Rwanda – both in which the international society and the UN stood by passively – 
resulted in that thousands of people were killed in a rate faster than under the Holocaust (Bellamy, 
2009:1).  
It has been argued that “international society is hardly a society at all, if it does not have a 
legitimate response to genocide.” (Knudsen, 1999: 403). The ICISS’ suggestion of a norm of ‘the 
responsibility to protect’ addressed this supposed normative gap in society and herein, attempted to 
answer Annan’s question by introducing a framework of moral imperative for international society. 
The ICISS report even paved the way for the UN General Assembly to, at the 2005 World Summit, 
adopt the World Summit Outcome Document in which the paragraphs 138 and 139 read:  
“138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. (…) The international community should, as 
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United 
Nations in establishing an early warning capability” (UN General Assembly, 2005: 31);  
“139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI 
and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely 
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including 
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
(…) We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build 
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
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humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out” (UN 
General Assembly, 2005: 31): thereby endorsing the main principles of the norm of the Responsibility to 
Protect set forth in the ICISS report. 
1.2 The Conflict in Darfur & the Respond of the International Society 
In 2003 the Sudanese government answered to armed rebellion forces in Western Darfur with 
immense killings and eviction by the Sudanese army and a proxy force called Janjaweed.  
Statistics of the crisis: 
• Over 300,000 civilians are reported to have died, a 50% increase from what the UN initially 
estimated;  
• 4.2 million people have been categorized as “war affected,” dependent on international 
assistance;  
• 2.5 million Darfurians have been displaced within Sudan;  
• Almost 240,000 refugees are being hosted by Chad and the Central African Republic; and  
• Thousands of villages have been burned and livelihoods destroyed (Darfurconsortium.org) 
 
The African Union deployed troops to end the violence already in 2004. This operation went by the 
name AMIS. However, the AMIS proved incapable of putting an end to the conflict.   
In May 2006 the government of Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Movement (/Army) and the Justice 
and Equality Movement signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) which was meant to act as a 
political solution to the conflict in Darfur. The parties agreed to put an end to the conflict in Darfur 
by “fully and effectively implement[ing] this agreement (…)” (DPA, 2006: 1) However, the DPA did 
not succeed in ending the conflict.  
Three months after the signing of the DPA, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1706, 
which authorised the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), however only in the “event that the on-going 
consultations between the Government of National Unity and the United Nations conclude on an 
agreement for a transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation” and the resolution “(…) 
invites the consent of the Government of National Unity for this deployment” (UNSC Resolution 1706, 
2006: 2 + 3). 
In July 2007 Resolution 1769 was passed. This resolution deployed UNAMID - “an AU/UN Hybrid 
Operation in Darfur” (UNSC Resolution 1769: 3).  
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Several reports, media and statements have pointed at the government of Sudan in Khartoum, 
through the use of the Janjaweed proxy force, as being a “prime mover” behind the atrocities in the 
region (Grono, 2006:625). 
In this sense the case has been described as taken directly from the “RtoP textbook” (Badescu, 
Bergmann, 2009: 294); it seems to be prime example of a case where a state commits mass atrocities 
against a part of its own people and thereby, a case where it seems to be obvious to operationalize 
the endorsed RtoP principle in making the international society react to protect the people of the 
state, which has failed to do so. Despite that international society has intervened before in ex, 
Somalia and DRC when atrocities were out-acted, the case of Darfur presents the first case wherein 
a functioning sovereign and ‘opposing’ government has been present (Taub, 2010: 3). 
Summing up, the crisis in the Darfur region was the first to be characterized through RtoP-language 
by the UN, and this – together with the above described – has resulted in many characterizing the 
Darfur crisis as a litmus test for the emerging norm of RtoP and humanitarian intervention, and 
international society’s will and ability to break state consent and live up to its commitments in the 
paragraphs 138 and 139 (Williams, Bellamy, 2005: 30).  
 
2. Problem Area 
The RtoP is perhaps the most extensive contribution to the debate about the development of a 
common international course in the sovereignty-intervention dilemma and in the question of nation-
states’ right to self-determination and sovereign borders.  
But even with the idea of the RtoP concept becoming a norm meant to unite the conflicting 
positions of international society to act in cases of mass atrocities where the national governments 
of the sovereign states are either unwilling or unable to protect its people, it seems from the case of 
the mass atrocities in the Darfur region, Sudan, that the operationalization of the norm and therein 
the ‘break’ of state consent, has proved more difficult than the rhetoric surrounding it, despite the 
fact that “boundaries between domestic societies and international society became ‘fuzzier’ in the 
last half of the twentieth century (…) accumulation of many international declarations (…) on 
human rights”(Vincent 1990: 254-5 in Jackson, Sørensen, 2007: 157) inevitably have challenged the idea of 
unchallengeable sovereign borders.  
The question remains whether the RtoP concept can succeed in bridging the gap of the international 
society in the question of what should be prioritized highest, in the quest for ensuring international 
SIB 21.2   
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order and stability; state sovereignty or securing of human justice for the peoples of the states. 
Building on to this question is the question of whether we can talk about the RtoP as an emerging 
norm of humanitarian intervention in the international society. Whether the RtoP is in practice an 
emerging norm would obviously depend on how the actors behind such a norm responds to the 
development of the norm and – even more importantly – the operationalization of the norm.  
 
This is what we wish to investigate in this project: whether we can talk about the RtoP as entailing 
an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention. We wish to attempt to give an answer to this 
question, which goes beyond what has been agreed to ‘on paper’, and one step further; namely to 
the states’ reaction to the operationalization of the agreed upon norm principles. We thus focus on 
the arising of the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine and the recent atrocity in Darfur as analytical 
tools towards or possible indicators of the international climate on intervention in case of mass 
atrocities, and we ask ourselves what these indicators may signify in a larger normative perspective. 
This is why we will look at the different states’ approaches on how to operationalize the RtoP 
principles in the case of the mass atrocities in Darfur. We will do this through the problem 
formulation: 
 
“Taking our point of departure in the different responses of the states of the international society to 
the question of how to operationalize the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in the case of the mass 
atrocities in the Darfur region, can we see indications of a developing international norm of 
humanitarian intervention?”  
3. Methodology 
3.1. Elaborating on the chosen problem formulation 
As mentioned, we wished to investigate whether we could see indications of an international norm 
of humanitarian intervention emerging in the international society.  
We found that the best way to investigate this would be to first look at how different states 
responded to the initial idea of the emergence of such a norm. We could stop here and draw an 
overall conclusion on whether we see an international norm of humanitarian intervention emerging. 
However, we did not find sufficient to conclude merely on a basis of state the rhetoric surrounding 
the emergence of such a norm. We found that, in order to conclude on whether we see indications 
of an international norm of humanitarian intervention emerging, we needed to also look at the 
SIB 21.2   
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relation between the rhetoric and processes of discussion and compromising behind the 
endorsement on the norm ‘on paper’ and the states’ attitude and reaction when the norm needed be 
implemented.  
This is why we chose to develop the problem formulation in such a way that we would take our 
point of departure in the states’ responses to the question of how to operationalize the RtoP in a 
specific case – namely Darfur. We chose to focus on their responses to the question of how as the 
paragraphs 138 and 139 presented above, which were endorsed by the international society, already 
determined that the norm should be operationalized.  
3.2 Progression 
We progress towards concluding on our problem formulation by; 
- Firstly presenting the theoretical framework, which will act as fundament for our understanding 
of the potential conflict inherited in the RtoP norm. We do this by introducing and nuancing the 
classic normative theoretical divide between ‘state sovereignty’ and ‘individual human justice’. 
Through this we gain an understanding on the possible stands of the international society on the 
question of whether to prioritize state sovereignty above humanitarian intervention for protecting 
human justice.   
- Secondly introducing a complimenting theory of different state types in contemporary 
international society and where these different state types stand in the debate we have introduced in 
the first part of the theory. We use this as a tool of analysing how the different states might have 
reacted to the emerging norm of the RtoP 
- Thirdly going into a discussing analysis of how norms emerge and develop and how different 
state types (mentioned by name) reacted to the emerging norm of the RtoP 
- Fourthly analysing the case of the international society’s respond to the mass atrocities 
- And finally concluding based on the previous findings and conclusion of the project, concluding 
on the problem formulation of whether we can see indications of an emerging international norm of 
humanitarian intervention 
 
After this we will go into a discussion of methodology and validity of the project to scrutinize- and 
put our conclusion and our work methods into perspective. 
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3.3 Academic Goal & Interests: 
Our academic goal of this project is to gain an enhanced understanding of international relations 
theory. The way we have chosen to do this, has been by developing a problem formulation that 
forced us to seek a broad understanding of the field, in order to understand the more focused 
discussion of what constituted world order and with what means this should be constituted. We 
furthermore developed our problem formulation in a way, where we got to use our gathered 
theoretical knowledge to understand and analyse a real life case; being the international society’s 
respond to the mass atrocities in Darfur. Hereby we thus not only enhance our broad understanding 
of international relations theory, but also discovers how to use the theory to enhance our 
understanding of- and perspectives on ‘reality’ – of course still being aware that theories in general, 
are not to be mistaken for portraying or explaining reality, which essentially will always prove more 
complex and unpredictable than the theory describing it. 
Attempting to understand the international society’s respond in a conflict like the one in Darfur has 
further proved to be of great relevance to current events in contemporary international politics; 
recently, the case of the conflict in Syria and the debates on how the international society should 
respond to this has taken much place in both media and academia.  
3.4 Choice and Use of Theory 
The overall theoretical field chosen for this project is the field of international relations.  
 
“International Relations Theory is the study of the relations among states and other political and 
economic units in the international system. Particular areas of study within the field of international 
relations include diplomacy and diplomatic history, international law, international organizations 
(…) and communications, among others. In addition, increased attention has been paid in recent 
years to developing a more scientific understanding of the international system as a whole. (…) As 
a separate and definable discipline (…) it dates from the early 20th century, when the first 
organized efforts were made to find alternatives to wars in nation-state international behavior”  
(Columbia University Press Encyclopedia, Article Title: International Relations.)  
 
International relations theory contains three traditional theoretical paradigms, which are the 
different parties in the ongoing inter-paradigm debates. These are realism, liberalism and Marxism. 
However, it seems that many contemporary questions of international relations fall outside the 
traditional theoretical frameworks (Holm, Sørensen, 1995: 1-3)/(Buzan, 2004: 10).  
SIB 21.2   
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When attempting to understand the different views within the international society on the 
humanitarian intervention/non-intervention debate, the theoretical framework of the English School 
does however, provide a suitable point of departure. It rejects the sharp division between realism 
and liberalism, and encompasses a methodology based on understanding the normative problems 
that shape and limit the political world of international relations. In other words; the English School 
attempts to transcend this inter-paradigm debate.   
Through an epistemology of historical interpretation and ontological understanding rather than one 
of explanation or construction of laws, the English School theory is “a theory about (and not of) 
norms”, says English School scholar Barry Buzan (Buzan, 2004: 24). 
Essentially, we can use the English School to understand what constitutes international society, as 
English School scholars seek to understand the international society through interpretations of the 
ideas and norms that constitutes it; this constitutive theorizing will prove valuable as a foundation 
of our analysis of whether we see indications of a developing international norm of humanitarian 
intervention.  
3.5 Delimitation & Specification  
 
Our attempt to understand the international society’s stand on sovereignty and intervention in the 
case of mass atrocities will be delimited to examine the arsing of the RtoP, it’s founding reports and 
its followed attempt of operationalization in Darfur. Thus we will in this project follow a rather 
inductive methodology. Whilst being aware, that the RtoP and Darfur remain only two examples of 
a much larger debate on human rights and sovereignty, we however find, on the basis of our chosen 
theoretical framework, that these two rather narrow examples are valid as analytical tools to access 
the normative nature of contemporary international society. The English School’s constitutive 
theorizing allows for norms to be significant and reciprocally recognizable for more fundamental 
structures, such as institutions. As the norm of RtoP can be interpreted as part of ‘a set of practices’ 
belonging to the institution of human rights, the RtoP necessarily affects other fundamental 
institutions, such as the ‘prime’ of sovereignty. Thus we find that the RtoP and the challenges of it’s 
operative nature, attempted to be understood through the case of Darfur, forms valid indicators 
within the chosen English School framework, of some fundamental structures and possible 
normative shifts of international society (Jovik, 2011: 8). 
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However, letting the English School stand as the sole theoretical frame of the analysis has proved 
insufficient when attempting to understand and analyse the international society’s reaction to the 
operationalization of the RtoP in actual conflicts - in this project in the conflict of Darfur. Our main 
problem of investigation lies in the reasons for the different central actors’ (the different states in 
the international society) either willingness to- or restraint from operationalizing of the norm of the 
RtoP which they agreed to “on paper”.  
We found the state typology set forth by English School scholar Georg Sørensen in his book 
“Changes in Statehood – the Transformation of International Relations” (Sørensen, 2001), to be an 
suitable complementation to our chosen English School theory. Sørensen generalises the states of 
the international society into three ideal types: the modern, the postmodern and the postcolonial 
state, and analyses the different state types’ approach to the institution of sovereignty – what 
Sørensen calls “the sovereignty game” (Sørensen, 2001). Using this state typology will serve as a 
valuable tool for us to understand some of the domestic, historical and cultural reasons for the 
different states’ approach to how to operationalize the RtoP in the conflict in Darfur. This 
understanding will enable us to understand why the different states reacted to the Darfur conflict the 
way they did and further it will enable us to critically scrutinize the RtoP norm in its present form.  
 
To sum up, the English School serves as our fundamental understanding of the normative divide 
central to our problem formulation; namely the divide between states that prioritize state 
sovereignty and those who prioritize human justice and thus invited the possibility of humanitarian 
intervention when human justice is not preserved. The state typology of Georg Sørensen will act as 
our analytical tool of investigating the different states’ responses to the question of how to 
operationalize the RtoP concept in the case of the mass atrocities in Darfur. Together the two 
provides the analytical framework of this project. 
 
Having briefly introduced our choice of theories and the reasons behind it, we will now proceed to a 
more thorough outline of how we use these theories in the project in order for us to answer our 
problem definition. 
 
 
 
SIB 21.2   
Roskilde University   Group 9 
 
 16
4. The English School 
 
The ‘English School’ is an international relations theory, which transcends the gap between the 
classic divisions within International Relations: the Marxists, the Liberalists and the Realists.  
This way the English School act as a ‘via-media’ of international relations theory.  
English School Scholar Martin Wight divided the on-going discussion within the English School – 
which will presented below – into one between three main branches of inspirations that differed in 
their approach to analysing international world politics. These three main branches that originally 
laid the foundation of the origin of the approach were: 
- the Machiavellian/realist understanding of an ‘international system’,  
- the Grotius/rationalist understanding of an ‘international society’ and  
- the Kantian/revolutionist understanding of a ‘world society’ (Buzan, 2004:7).  
 
 
The English School of International Relations 
 
 
Machiavellian/realists  Grotius/rationalists               Kantian/revolutionist 
 
Pluralists Solidarist 
 
 
 
 
Focus of the English School is thus both on international power balances and on the study of ideas 
and ideologies, inter-state relations and the norms, rules and institutions constituting them (Jackson, 
Sørensen, 2007: 47-48 + 129). In the three branches or ‘levels’ portrayed above, this rather wide-
encompassing focus – varying in degrees between either the ‘material’ or the ‘ideational’ – to some 
extent constitutes what is often referred to as the English School’s methodological ‘pluralism’.  
Surely, different scholars put emphasis on different levels. Hedley Bull, a leading English School 
scholar, characterized the international society as an ‘anarchical society’; the importance of power 
and national interests are here acknowledged, as well as the importance of common norms and 
institutions are: “A group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, 
SIB 21.2   
Roskilde University   Group 9 
 
 17
form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in 
their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull, 1995, p. 13). 
This is where an international society differs from an international system or a world society.  
We will now go on to an introduction of the Grotius/rationalist ‘international society’-approach, as 
this and its central subdivision of scholars will constitute our foundation of obtaining understanding 
of the question of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. 
 
4.1 The Grotius/Rationalist International Society Approach 
Despite that our approach has been delimited to only one of the three original English School 
approaches, there approach still contains contesting ontologies. The main division of scholars 
within this rationalist approach is between the solidarists and the pluralists. What divides the 
solidarists and the pluralists is their different views on the type and extent of norms, rules and 
institutions that international society (being an ‘anarchical society’) can contain, whilst still 
essentially being based on a system of sovereign nation-states (Buzan, 2004: 8); in other words their 
disagreement is about the constitutive nature of different institutions of the international society.  
The examination of the debate between solidarists and pluralists will naturally serve to understand 
the ontological nature behind the principle of the RtoP, as this is first and foremost to be understood 
as a concept that seeks to unite the different normative understandings of international behavior 
(Bellamy, 2007: 22). Whilst scholars of both respective branches within the ES clearly vary in their 
degree of absolute adherence to one of the branches of solidarism and pluralism only, we find that 
their beliefs and considerations of sovereignty as the founding institution and this’ ability to change, 
and their focus on either states or individuals as primary agents, constitutes a division clear enough 
to generalize the opposing views. 
Thus, and despite solidarists and pluralists inevitably being intertwined, we will in this part of the 
project use these two stands as somewhat clashing ‘ideal types’ to which different English School 
scholars will be compared and related.  
 
The solidarist and the pluralist both seek ways to obtain world order. The disagreement between the 
two approaches is on how to obtain it.  
In order to properly understand this division, we must first understand their differing perceptions of 
the central constitutive concepts of norms, rules and institutions.  
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4.1.1 Rules, Norms and Institutions 
The concepts of rules, norms and institutions are central to the English School perception of state 
interaction within the international society. In order to understand this, we must first comprehend 
the concepts from an English School point of view. Following is a discussion of the English School 
ontological view on international society and the believed ability to for said international society to 
cooperate. This discussion will be facilitated through considerations of the internally differing 
perceptions of rules, norms and institutions (Buzan, 2002). 
 
4.1.2 Norms & Rules 
Norms are understood as customary implicit codes of social behaviour, differing from rules, which 
are more specific, formal and legal3 (Buzan, 2002). Most English School scholars acknowledge that 
while international patterns of interaction might be hard to establish and contain, rules and 
especially norms, play vital roles in achieving and maintaining common interests and order.  
Despite the constitutive acknowledgement of norms and rules, it is questioned to what extent these 
are contingent upon more fundamental structures of international society.  
To understand whether this is the case, we must look into the English School concept of institutions 
and the role they play in the arising of ‘standards of behavior’, which are challenged by underlying 
structures of the international society; “the norm definition isolates single standards of behavior, 
whereas institutions emphasize the way in which behavioral rules are structured together and 
interrelate (a ‘‘collection of practices and rules’’). Used carefully (…) norm language can help to 
steer scholars toward looking inside social institutions and considering the components of social 
institutions as well as the way these elements are renegotiated into new arrangements over time to 
create new patterns of politics.” (Finnemore, Sikkink, 2005: 891). 
We further investigate the concepts of institutions to find out which institutions the RtoP is 
embedded in and seeks to reconcile.  
 
4.1.3 Institutions 
Hedley Bull suggested the concept of institutions as facilitators or ‘fundamental practices’ of 
sustaining collaboration and order; “by institution we do not necessarily imply (…) administrative 
machinery, but rather a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realization of common 
goals”(Hedley Bull in Knudsen, 1999: 42). The institutions should thus not act as “surrogates for laws”, 
                                                        
3 – despite that Krasner also notes that both norms and rules can be implicit and explicit. 
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or “deprivers of states’ responsibilities”, but rather as legitimate practices or protectors of 
collaboration and order. (Ibid) 
Bull recognized five fundamental institutions of international society; war, international law, 
balance of power, diplomacy and great power management. The goals of said five institutions are 
primary, in the sense that all other goals presuppose their fulfilling (Knudsen, 1999: 39).   
However, there is not a broad consensus about Bull’s classification of the five fundamental 
institutions.  
American professor of philosopher John Searle indicates that the basic character of society can be 
understood through the ‘institutional facts’ arising from collective intentionality, and that this 
intentionality opens the possibility of an indefinite number of institutions existing. Searle notes in 
this connection though, that there certainly is a hierarchical difference between the institutional 
facts and the institutions they derive from, as these may differ in their purposefulness and their 
(fundamental) attachment to norms or rules (Buzan, 2002).  
So the difference between Bull’s and Searle’s interpretation of institutions is, that whereas Bull 
classifies five fundamental primary institutions with which nothing else can be juxtaposed, Searle 
indicates that the basic character of international society can be understood as the institutional facts 
the international society agrees on. 
 
Barry Buzan (2002) interprets this notation of a hierarchical order and specifies Bull’s notion of 
prime institutions, by operating with primary and secondary institutions. Secondary institutions is 
by Buzan characterized as the administrative operationalization of the concept of primary 
institutions, and refers to concrete organizational machineries based on incorporated and viewable 
rules, e.g. the United Nations, NATO or the African Union. Primary institutions are described as 
“durable and recognised patterns of shared practices rooted in values held commonly by the 
members of interstates societies”, and are thus closer to social constructs than the secondary 
institutions. They “must play a constitutive role in relation to both the pieces/players and the rules 
of the game” (Buzan in Jensen, 2007: 12), but they do not operationalize the rules, as much as they 
constitute them. The primary institutions thus represent fundamentally shared underlying norms, 
identities or values according to Buzan, not only as facilitators of common goals as for Bull, but as 
constitutors of the very interaction of states. A resembling illustration can be found in Martin 
Wight’s writings (1977: 111-112), “Diplomacy is the institution for negotiating, alliances are the 
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institution for effecting common interest (…) War is the institution for the final settlement of 
differences”. 
4.2 Change in Institutions? 
In the above we concluded that institutions are hierarchal in their role of being constitutive of state 
interaction. 
In this paragraph we will examine the possibility of change in institutions. We find this to be 
important, as the concept of the RtoP has been presented as attempting to redefine the traditional 
institution of sovereignty.   
Hedley Bull (1977:71) found that “states themselves (…) are the principal institutions of the society 
of states”. Bull was backed up by a large number of realist-rationalist inspired ES scholars. In this 
statement, Bull implies that the traditional Westphalian sovereignty game should remain the 
fundament of society; and that all other institutions are secondary to states. It is noteworthy though, 
that Bull in his writings included the possibility of the institution of sovereignty to adapt or evolve.  
Richard Falk4 formulated two necessary principles of operationalization if the institutions were to 
evolve, being the arising of an increased central authority and guidance and an enlarged role of non-
territorial actors. However, both Falk and Bull seem to agree that “there is no clear evidence that 
(…) the states system is likely to give place to any alternatives (...)(but) there is now a wider world 
political system of which the states system is only a part” (Bull/Falk in Jackson, Sørensen, 2007: 158-159).  
Some revolutionist-rationalist inspired English School scholars also claim that the primary 
institutions not only adapt, but also change and even decline.  
Barry Buzan (2002) is one of these, distinguishing himself from Bull’s definition, because of the 
notion of realist static thinking and the clash it meets in Buzan’s definition of primary institutions as 
“shared practices rooted in values”; suggesting a clear possibility of not only adaption or 
evolvement, but also rise and change of primary institutions.  
Thus the institution of sovereignty does not necessarily remain unchallenged. 
However, Buzan (2002) does not suggest fundamental change for primary institutions. Even if an 
institution of human rights will inevitably challenge the one of sovereignty, it would not necessarily 
mean that the one of sovereignty would decline immediately.  
Tonny Brems Knudsen5 (1999: 45) terms this reservation ‘bounded constructivism’ and notes that 
while change has and will continuously occur6, this change demands time and is resistant. As Buzan 
                                                        
4 Richard Anderson Falk (born 1930) is an American professor emeritus of international law at Princeton University, the author or 
co-author of 20 books and the editor or co-editor of another 20 books 
5 Ph.D. in international politics, fellow researcher at Institute of Political Sciences, Aarhus University 
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(2002) points out: while basic norms and institutions make cooperation possible, they also have a 
built-in resistance, by being fundamental and highly dependent on the international society and the 
values that the majority chooses – or agrees – to confess to.  
English School scholars, including Bull and Buzan, seem to agree though, that primary institutions 
evolve and develop around fundamental norms or internationally legitimized mechanisms, which to 
some extent, can shape the interplay of international actors; the most important being states.  
 
Buzan (2002) finds the main institutional conflict to be between those English School scholars 
opting for sovereignty as presupposing for all other institutions of international society, and the 
scholars focusing on the possibility of rise and decline of these institutions. The latter point of view 
takes a step away from the view on sovereignty as the traditional precondition for stability, and 
approaches a more intervention-oriented primary institution of human rights and human justice. 
Buzan (2002) points at this institutional conflict of sovereignty versus human rights, as testing the 
degree of confession to realist-rationalism (pluralism) or revolutionist-rationalism (solidarism).   
Realist-rationalist inspired scholars such as Bull will not tend to acknowledge any institution above 
or threatening the one of sovereignty, despite other institutions possibly being present and 
somewhat codifying state behaviour. Tonny Brems Knudsen (1999) and Thomas G. Weiss7 (2007) on 
the other hand, are some of many contemporary revolutionist-inspired scholars, arguing that recent 
events8 indicate, that humanitarian intervention has become a legitimate means of action in 
international society, and that one can therefore talk about a primary institution of human rights, 
comparable to Bull’s notion of primary institutions, by presupposing; ”the right to life (…) Such a 
right is basic in the sense (…) that enjoyment of it is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights” 
(Henry Shue in Vincent, 1986: 125).  
 
Thus it can be concluded that the English School theoretical framework accepts shared norms and 
rules as conditions for behaviour in international society. This is not only through concrete 
negotiation in the secondary institutions, i.e. the UN, but also in primary institutions as they are the 
constitutive frameworks for provoking the emergence and development of concepts evolving into 
norms and rules.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
6 The institution of war may not be a legitimate institution of final settlement any longer. 
7 Thomas J. Weiss is an emeritus professor of Economics at the University of Kansas and a research associate at the National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
8 Where ”decisions have been made (…) to use military force to protect human beings caught in (…) internal repression: in Somalia, 
Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, for example.” (Gareth Evans’ foreword in Weiss, 2007) 
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The discussion of primary institutions is therefore not one of what is, as much as it is one of what 
will be: especially in the case of sovereignty as the fundamental institution – and the case of the 
possible norm of RtoP in Darfur as an indication of what will; will sovereignty be contested or 
remain unchallenged.  
The main sides of the debate on institutions within the ES have now been presented. The points of 
view in the debate are somewhat conflicting and even with the agreement about the importance of 
(primary) institutions there are differing opinions on the number, hierarchical order and nature of 
said institutions. 
We will now go on to an elaboration of how these debates constitute themselves in the context of 
the concept of the RtoP and consequently, whether the RtoP can be perceived as unifying the two 
sides of the debate.  
 
Norms: 
- Norms describe ‘standards of behaviour’ 
- They can indicate more fundamental 
structures of international society 
- Fundamental structures of society can be 
defined as primary institutions varying in 
their importance and attachment to norms 
Institutions: 
- Institutions can be divided into primary and 
secondary institutions 
- The perception of which primary institutions 
presupposes others are reliant on the given 
ontological viewpoints, just as the perception 
of the possibility of change or evolvement is
 
4.2.1 The RtoP in Context 
The concept of the RtoP was presented as a common course of final consensus and compromise of 
the international society in the intervention-sovereignty debate. The RtoP thus seems to entail a 
presumption of the institution of sovereignty as already co-existing with the one of human rights.  
 
Thus, by presenting the possibility of states to be scrutinized, the concept of RtoP promotes the 
institution of human rights and poses in theory, and contests the perception of sovereignty as the 
prime institution of the international society. 
 Still, central to ES scholars is the question of whether the contested institution of state sovereignty 
will decline or merely adapt in the future. As proved above revolutionary change or evolutionary 
adaption is an ontological question central to the ES, and to further understand the differing 
ontological viewpoints on sovereignty and the RtoP, we will now, as promised earlier in this 
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chapter, investigate the above-mentioned internal ontological divisions of the rationalist English 
School approach; namely the division between the pluralists and the solidarists.  
We will put up the two sides as ‘clashing ideal types’ and their differing ontologies will be 
portrayed through an examination of their approach to the concepts of order and justice. 
Representing the pluralist side of the debate will be Robert Jackson and Hedley Bull, who 
emphasize the importance of restricting use of force to self-defense in order to maintain interstate 
order. On the solidarist side are Thomas Weiss, J.R. Vincent and Tonny Brems Knudsen 
representing a category of solidarists supporting individual justice through highlighting the 
emerging norms and institution connected to human justice; presenting this as new possibilities to 
secure justice and stability in international society (Black, Williams, 2008: 5). This will help us 
understand, which viewpoints may have been the background for the different responses of the 
international society to the RtoP. 
 
4.2.2 Pluralist – Order and Justice 
For the pluralists the concept of order has highest priority in the ‘society of anarchy’, which they 
believe constitutes the international society. As such it becomes evident that even if representing the 
rationalists of the English School approach, their worldview is close to that of the English School 
realists rationalists. The institution of sovereignty is by the pluralists perceived as being the 
fundament of promoting and preserving international order and stability (Jackson, Sørensen, 2007: 141-
42). 
Robert Jackson interprets sovereignty as based on an idea of order and liberation; the 
institutionalization of sovereignty supposedly prevents ‘forced’ applied behaviour from any 
international authoritarian institution or regime. The term ‘pluralist’ thus carries a notion of power 
decentralization, national responsibility and communitarian beliefs (Jackson, Sørensen, 2007: 141-42).  
Hedley Bull presents the concept of justice as complementing to order. He finds that interstate or 
international justice – recognition of for example sovereign rights – can prevent relative inequality 
leading to war among states (Jackson, Sørensen, 2007). While the concept of order is still highest 
priority, Bull believes that the concept specified as international communitative9 justice can 
maintain and complement this order.  
Bull presents three levels of order in international politics; order in social life, international order 
and finally, world order. World order is recognized as the most fundamental, and the balances of 
                                                        
9 ”Communitative justice is about procedures and reciprocity (…) all (…) play by the same rules of the market (…) Justice is fairness 
(…) applied in the same way to everybody” (Bull in Jackson, Sørensen, 2007:145). 
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power between states are therefore suggested to be the primary means of obtaining order (Jackson, 
Sørensen, 2007: 142-143).  
In this sense, the pluralists clearly differ between the external and internal lives and responsibilities 
of states, focusing on international law and the external “social life” of the state, as fundamental 
conditions for world order. Social order and national responsibility is not neglected, but exercised 
through sovereignty (Jackson, Sørensen, 2007).  
While the state to the pluralists of course has other responsibilities than maintaining order, these are 
often described as ‘secondary’ – the ethical priority of liberty and justice through non-intervention 
comes first. The pluralist stand thus acknowledges a possible institution of human rights, but sees it 
as a secondary institution, as the institution of sovereignty has to exist before any other moral 
values can be pursued orderly. The pluralist point of view is thus highly connected to the realist-
rationalist belief of sovereignty as the prime and ‘unchangeable’ institution. 
  
4.2.3 Solidarists – Order and Justice 
The ontological stand of the solidarists is fundamentally different from the one of pluralists as it 
originates from the revolutionary ‘world society’-understanding within the English School. Inspired 
by Kant’s deontological categorical imperatives of moral responsibility (Buzan, 2004:7), the 
solidarists believe that responsibility is not divided into levels of priority, but is a universal duty. 
This because International society is not perceived to be constituted by sovereign autonomous units, 
but rather shaped as an ecosystem, where “each of us (are) vulnerable to the four horsemen of the 
planetary apocalypse: nuclear disaster, resource depletion, pollution of the environment and 
population growth.” (Vincent, 1986: 124).  
Consequently, the solidarist perception of the concept of liberty is different from the pluralist. In the 
solidarist view, liberty is a minimum right for the individual human being more than it is the state’s 
right to organize itself. The concept of justice is to be understood as individual or ‘human justice’, 
as Bull terms it (Jackson, Sørensen, 2007: 145, 146, 158). 
The solidarists do not oppose the constitutive importance of sovereignty, however it is not 
perceived as relevant to the challenges of today (Vincent, 1986: 118-119). New threat assessments like 
the ‘war on terror’ and humanitarian conflicts like the civil war in Chad10 shows the emergence of 
new security threats which are beyond the control and possible management of the traditional 
                                                        
10 ”(…)the civil war in (…) Chad spilled over into Darfur in the 1980s, and the government in Khartoum turned a blind eye as militia 
drawn from Darfur’s Arab tribes armed themselves with the support of their Chadian brethren and tried to seize land from their Fur 
and Masalit neighbours.” (de Waal, Alex, 2007: 1039). 
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nation state (Weiss, 2007: 2-6)/ (Sørensen, 2007: 171)/(Vincent, 1986)/(Knudsen, 1999). This fact has 
arguably strengthened the argument for intervention as more constitutive for world order than a 
non-intervention based idea of sovereignty.  
The way solidarists link internal and external order shows a more holistic approach to the concept 
of order, and as such, the solidarists seem to juxtapose the two concepts of order and justice – or 
even prefer the concept of justice to the one of order. However, the concept of justice preferred by 
the solidarists differs somewhat from the communicative justice described above. The solidarists do 
not perceive justice as communicative, but rather as distributive11. Thus, sovereignty is still a 
central institution to the solidarists, but it is not absolute: it is conditioned on the extent to which it 
gives space to ‘universalism’ and ‘common good’ (Vincent, 1986: 118). Sovereignty and statehood 
thus take secondary places, as they are inadequate to secure (globalized) world order, and morally 
dependent on the states’ capability of maintaining and promoting internal security and human 
rights. 
 
Having presented the main differences between the solidarist and the pluralist approaches, we will 
now turn our attention to what is at the centre of the disagreement between the solidarist and 
pluralist ontology; namely the question of whether humanitarian intervention, which is arguably the 
most operational feature of the institution of human rights, is an acceptable means of maintaining 
justice and thus order, and whether it can become a legitimate norm of a humans right institution. 
This question is also central in the debates about the international society’s respond to the RtoP, for 
as Tonny Brems Knudsen (1999: 89) points out, “the absence or presence of humanitarian 
intervention is (…) an important indicator of the condition of international society” later judging 
that “international society is hardly a society at all, if it does not have a legitimate response to 
genocide.” (1999: 89).  
 
4.3 Humanitarian Intervention 
 
”(…) Coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another state 
without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or 
death among the inhabitants” (Adam Roberts in Weiss, 2007: 5). 
                                                        
11 “Distributive justice is about (…) how goods should be distributed between states” (Bull in Jackson, Sørensen, 2007: 145, 147, 
148) and about “the principle of equal liberty, and the difference principle by which economic inequalities were to be arranged to 
benefit of the least advantaged” (Vincent, 1986: 119). 
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Summing up from the previous paragraph, the pluralists see sovereignty as the primary institution 
for keeping world order. The solidarists on the other hand see individual justice as the most 
important factor in maintaining world order. Furthermore the solidarists see the threat assessment of 
today as one that calls for international interference in domestic state affaires, the threats to 
individuals today cross borders and cannot be dealt with by the states individually.  
What is presented below is first the pluralist view on humanitarian intervention and following is the 
solidarist same.  
 
The pluralist approach generally views the possible norm of humanitarian intervention as a threat to 
self-determination and liberty of the nation-states, whilst humanitarian intervention case-by-case 
becomes a ‘Trojan horse’, meaning that the interveners can pursue national interests when deciding 
on the intervention, instead of emphasizing the needs of the people of the country in which the 
intervention is meant to take place (Weiss, 2004: 135). This way, the result of humanitarian 
intervention is not considered likely to enhance neither justice nor order (Vincent, 1986: 114).  
Bull emphasizes though, that individual justice may evolve around the principle of non-intervention 
and order; he argues for this, by the example of state sovereignty given to colonized people in 
Africa, which was widely regarded upon as morally prior to the world order of Western 
colonialism. In conclusion Bull states that world politics cannot be understood by focusing 
exclusively on justice or order (Jackson, Sørensen, 2007: 146). In the pluralist view, humanitarian justice 
stems from equality of states and international order based on self-help or collective multilateral 
enforcement of international law (Knudsen, 1999: 72), rather than on human beings as subjects of 
international law and centralized action. Thus, if any humanitarian action were to take place, the 
multilateral platform of the UN would be the only recognized possibility by the pluralists. 
 
The solidarist view on humanitarian intervention differs significantly from the pluralist one. The 
primary agents in this approach are not considered to be states as much as it is individuals; the 
principle of humanitarian intervention naturally becomes the last resort of ‘the common good’ of 
human kind (Knudsen, 1999: 63), and somewhat even a part of the notion of distributive justice.  
While the solidarists recognize that humanitarian interventions may often be based on national 
interest, this is not perceived to be a problem, as long as it does not conflict with a humanitarian 
outcome (Wheeler, 2005: 35). Thomas Weiss (2004: 135) underpins this point “… the concerns of the 
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most vehement critics, especially developing countries, are misplaced because the problem is too 
little humanitarian intervention, not too much”; indicating that cautiousness and moral hesitations 
concerning humanitarian interventions might actually be more of a problem than personal interests 
and imperialism.  
The legitimate base for humanitarian intervention arguably lies in Kant’s deontology and ‘natural 
law’12, which the solidarists detects in the UN Charter13 (Knudsen, 1999: 60-62). And so, the solidarists 
endorse any humanitarian action and emphasize that humanitarian interventions have often been 
enterprises of international collective authorization, supervision and implementation (despite that 
the solidarists would be open to UN unauthorized action too) (Knudsen, 1999: 62-63).  
Finally, Tonny Brems Knudsen (1999:63) argues that humanitarian intervention (especially if it were 
to become an international norm or rule) can be viewed as the most explicit manifest of solidarist 
principles; implementing action and using force for individual rights and ‘common good’; 
exemplifying solidarism and cooperation in international society, through an acceptance of the 
validity of basic solidarist principles. The possibility of supranational governance or collective 
action, such as humanitarian intervention, arising as practices of the institution of human rights is 
consequently accepted – turning sovereignty dependent on other institutions (Knudsen, 1999: 63). 
 
4.4 English School Preliminary Conclusion 
In this chapter we have so far presented the theoretical foundation of the English School of 
international relations theory with the goal of presenting the conflicting points of view on the 
question of what constitutes order in the international society.  
We have examined the normative division within the Grotius/rationalist branch of the English 
School, based on either pluralist and the solidarist ontology, and found that what divides the two 
approaches is their different views on whether humanitarian intervention is an acceptable means of 
maintaining justice and thus order, and whether it can become a legitimate norm of a humans rights 
institution. To find out this, we looked into the different perceptions of primary and secondary 
institutions and the possibility of changes in the institutions.  
We found that the pluralists as their point of departure believe that state sovereignty is the primary 
unchallengeable institution of international society and that humanitarian intervention would 
undermine this international order. The solidarists on the other hand, found individuals to be the 
                                                        
12 ”… natural law in the modern sense embraced by Lauerpacht, that is a source of morality and reason.” (Knudsen, 1999: 62). 
13 ”(…)UN Security Council Resolutions, implies the simple point that outragous treatment of individuals are intolerable in human 
society.” (Knudsen, 1999: 62) 
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central agents of the international society, and justice for said individuals to be one of the prime 
concerns in obtaining international order: thus accepting interventions with humanitarian purposes.  
Finally, the concept of responsibility has been contextualized within both branches; where the 
pluralists place special emphasis on national responsibility as the highest priority and then 
international responsibility, stressing ethics and communitative international justice, the solidarists 
highlights international responsibility and confesses to a moral-based universal responsibility, 
stressing the ideals of individual justice and what Bull termed ‘distributive justice’. 
 
Having presented what can be seen as the traditional line of thought within the English School, 
through a presentation of the main division in opinions within the school, we will now proceed to a 
critique of said traditional line of thought.  
 
4.5 Critique of the English School 
 
When attempting to determine whether we in reality can find indications of a developing norm of 
humanitarian intervention, the English School does not seem to provide a sufficient frame.  
As states are mostly analysed as coherent units of interaction, it seems hard to analyse which actual 
domestic differences among states might contribute to determine the normative stand towards the 
RtoP and the call for revision of the institution of sovereignty in praxis: the pluralist stand of 
English School does not seem interested in analysing state motives of behaviour, as long as they 
adhere to and fulfil the institution of sovereignty, and respect international law and legitimacy. The 
solidarists, confessing to universal justice and emphasizing the link between internal and external 
order, present a more fitting perspective for trying to understand different states’ response to the 
RtoP and humanitarian intervention. However, this perspective remains internationally focused, and 
does not provide a model of analysis as much as normative course of action in cases of mass 
atrocities. 
Telling the story, as we have done so far, of the divisions between what we have referred to as the 
‘clashing ideal types’ of solidarism and pluralism, lacks the nuance needed to proceed with the 
argument of this project, as we wish to analyse whether we see a norm developing outside the 
theoretical frame; namely in international real politics of state interaction.  
Buzan puts it this way: “IR needs to shift perspective so that it sees these stories not as alternative, 
mutually exclusive, interpretations, but as a linked set, each illuminating a different facet of reality” 
(Buzan, 2011: 480). Prior to this point, Buzan argues, “The two concepts are in some foundational 
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ways linked together. Pluralism has to rest on some elements of solidarism, and solidarism depends 
on the pluralist framework to structure its political order” (Buzan, 2011: 480). Even if the classic 
divide of the two “clashing ideal types” was not meant as such, they through time came to be “used 
in mutually exclusive ways” (Weinert, 2011: 40). However, it further seems that “the international 
society as a whole could not be adjudged to be either pluralist or solidarist” (Weinert, 2011: 40).  
The way Tonny Brems Knudsen puts this is  “If it can be shown that pluralist and solidarist 
principles of international society are not mutually exclusive, this would be a serious blow to the 
assumption that the problems of humanitarian intervention are insurmountable” (Knudsen, 1999: 17); 
and it would seem that in the analysis of real politics “pluralist commitments may impede 
solidarism as much as solidarist commitments may impede pluralism” (Weinert, 2011: 40).  
This would indicate the importance of not reducing the (re)action of different actors towards the 
operationalization of the RtoP concept in Darfur to merely a question of whether they are solidarists 
or pluralists. “(…) Pluralism and solidarism have outlived their potential utility as mutually 
exclusive macro judgments and recasting them as ideal-typical micro assessments of particular 
issue-areas such as human security. (…) Human security might therefore best be understood as both 
pluralist and solidarist.” (Weinert, 2011: 40-41).  
 
Drawing from what we learned above from the remarks of some of the leading English School 
thinkers Knudsen, Buzan and Weinert, there seems to in fact be a situation where it is relevant to 
question the way the two approaches of solidarism and pluralism have been set up as mutually 
exclusive sets of frameworks.  
In our problem formulation we state that our purpose of this project is to determine whether we 
could find indications of a developing norm of humanitarian intervention, based on the different 
states’ reaction towards how to implement the RtoP principles in the case of the conflict in Darfur. 
We have now presented the theoretical fundament of understanding the classic normative divide 
between the pluralist who argue for state sovereignty as the main constituent for world order and 
the solidarist who argue for humanitarian intervention as a means of obtaining international order. 
This way we have enhanced our understanding of the potential conflict of the RtoP norm. 
So, in order to understand how this debate constitutes itself in international real politics, we now 
introduce the state typology of Georg Sørensen, as presented in his “Changes of Statehood” (2001). 
Georg Sørensen herein presents three ideal types of states: the modern, postmodern and the 
postcolonial state type. He maps the domestic conditions and security dilemmas that may affect the 
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state’s response to international structures, because as Sørensen (2001: 170) points out “the study of 
international order black-boxes the domestic affairs of states”. This state typology will help us 
provide an understanding of how the different states reacted to the RtoP in Darfur and shed light 
upon some of the factors influencing these differing reactions.  
 
4.6 Georg Sørensen and the English School 
Whilst admitting that the English School rationalist approach is well adequate for analysing 
normative and constitutional changes, Sørensen argues that the English School is in need of a more 
domestic focus as “When any analysis of change and development (…) is (…) downplayed, the 
emergence of (…) states can easily be overlooked.” (Sørensen, 2001: 171). The English School has 
arguably failed to take the change from modern (Westphalian) to contemporary globalized society 
of states into account, according to Sørensen; the traditional pluralist argument that international 
order results from the state’s authority and legitimacy to adopt ‘a good life’ for its citizen, does 
accordingly not match the contemporary challenges of globalized international society. Here, the 
preservation of sovereignty has instead resulted in some states having committed mass atrocities 
towards its own population and some weak states’ internal domestic issues having had significant 
spillover effects on other states. However, Sørensen (2001: 172), in line with Bull’s previous 
presented claim, also remarks that there currently exists neither a developed cosmopolitan order of a 
transcending arrangement nor a viewable political will to establish such segmented authority.  
Thus, in this ‘via media-world of today’, Sørensen takes one step further than Bull and other 
English School scholars, by trying to understand how contemporary states perceive sovereignty, 
order and security, and how this affects international order and the political normative climate in 
large. The RtoP-related revision – or change – of perceptions of ex, security and sovereignty has 
thus been put in focus, not only by the ES’ normative divides of solidarism and pluralism, but also 
by multiple ‘domestic’ factors constituting contemporary flux society. Sørensen thus opens the 
“black boxes” of English School theory, in his attempt to understand the international society’s 
direction of normative movement; like this ‘fully’ exploring the revision or change possibly 
happening. 
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5. Georg Sørensen’s State Typology 
In his book “Changes in Statehood – the Transformation of International Relations” (2001), Georg 
Sørensen presents a division of states into three main ideal types: the modern state, the postmodern 
state and the postcolonial state, and analyses how these different types of states view the 
international society, the concept of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. Exploring the 
background for Sørensen’s division of the ideal types of states, we look into three main aspects of 
the different states, namely what we find to be 1) the central characteristics and the relevant 
historical background (as presented by Sørensen), 2) the different kinds of security dilemmas in the 
different types of states and 3) their differing views on the international society and humanitarian 
intervention. Following this, we contextualize each state type with the English School framework, 
and finally we briefly discuss a way to operationalize the ideal types. 
We will use these findings to understand how the different state types react toward the RtoP norm 
in general and how they reacted to the attempted implementation of the norm in the case of the 
conflict in Darfur. By looking at how the states react in practice towards the norm, we hope to be 
able to determine whether a norm of humanitarian intervention might be developing in practice.   
 
All states “posses constitutional independence which means they are recognized under international 
law as legally valid members of the society of states” (Sørensen, 2001: 73). 
 
5.1 The Modern State 
5.1.1 Central Characteristics 
In short, the modern state is characterized by Sørensen as a centralized system of rule, with a high 
level of cohesion between state and nation, and a self-sustained “segregated economy”, wherein a 
big part of the economic activity takes place domestically (Sørensen, 2001: 83). Central to the modern 
state is that it provides basic welfare goods for its people and that there is a high level of social 
cohesion. The foundation of these characteristics lie in the historical development of the modern 
states; a development that is the result of a long historical process of statehood development that 
started early in Europe (Sørensen, 2001: 74-77). The modern state can thus be viewed as the 
‘traditional’ nation state, in the sense that it as a concept was the fundament upon which the 
Westphalian peace was built. Bull’s definition of the five primary institutions was based on the idea 
of the modern state; as such the modern state is the point of departure for the traditional pluralist 
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perception of sovereignty. 
5.1.2 The Security Dilemma (The “Classic Security Dilemma”) 
As the modern states have been characterized as having relatively good welfare systems, 
functioning jurisdiction, and a high level of social cohesion, the individual security of the 
population is – in theory – already protected, and the main threats for the state and its nation are 
primarily perceived as being external. Still, Sørensen points out that whilst the state on the one 
hand, is what protects its people from external threats, the modern state itself can also pose a source 
of threat to the people. This he defines as being the main security dilemma of the modern state, 
using as a point of departure the theory set forth by Thomas Hobbes where Hobbes argues that the 
main source of security for the people of a given state is the very system of the state; without it 
people would, according to Hobbes, live “in the nasty and brutish state of nature where egoistic 
humans will always get at each other’s throats” (Hobbes in Sørensen, 2001: 94). But as Sørensen asks, if 
humans are that beasty and will de facto get in each other’s throats, how can we be assured that this 
is not the case with the state elite? Sørensen here points at what is commonly referred to, as the 
Hobbesian paradox (Sørensen, 2001: 94, quoting Wight 1991: 35 and Keohane, 1995: 168): the state, while 
protecting its people against external threats by increasing state power and military, at the same 
time poses a threat to its own people: as a given state, by increasing power, poses a threat to other 
modern states, their only solution would be to increase their respective state power, and thus pose 
an even bigger threat to the first state in question; “balances of power that may lead to war” 
(Sørensen, 2001: 127). 
5.1.3 Modern States, Sovereignty & Humanitarian Intervention 
From a modern state view, the central features of sovereignty are non-intervention and reciprocity. 
The central feature of non-intervention implies that each state is responsible for the security of its 
borders and its people and the states thus decide for themselves how to deal with internal, as well as 
external problems; just as whether and to what extent they wish to seek assistance from the 
international society (Sørensen, 2001: 153). So here we see a clear segregation between what is 
domestic and what is international in the modern state view; the national polity, economy and 
jurisdiction remain national and are not to be sought controlled or regulated by external forces; 
“Non-intervention is the recognition in formal rule terms that there is a clearly defined domestic 
realm” (Sørensen, 2001: 154).  
Reciprocity is to be understood as the way modern states see it fit to connect the ‘domestic’ with the 
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‘international’ for mutual gain (Ibid). Being that the modern states are strong states capable of 
providing security and welfare for their people, it seems logical for them to keep the domestic and 
international sphere segregated. Sørensen further writes that reciprocity “is the defining condition 
on which relations between inside and outside can be established” (Ibid).  
So to sum up, it seems that modern states, despite being open for reciprocal relations, would value 
any state’s sovereignty above international law, as this is the most beneficial for the modern states 
themselves, and thus it seems that the modern states would be against any form of humanitarian 
intervention without the consent of the state in question.  
What we can draw from the above introduction to the modern state is a rather correspondence with 
the basic beliefs and assumptions of the pluralists. 
5.1.4 Discussion of Modern Ideal Type 
Sørensen mainly refers to the ideal of the modern state as the liberalized industrialized OECD states 
of Europe, North America, Japan and Oceania during the early post World War II years (Sørensen, 
2001: 83). However, as we have now entered a new century, these examples seem somewhat invalid 
and thus Sørensen, in a complementary article (Sørensen, 2009: 230), elaborate on the operationalizing 
of the ‘redundant’ modern states, by introducing the complementing ideal type of the ‘modernizing’ 
state. This ideal type rests on the fundament of the modern ideal type, but differs by combining 
features of all three original ideal types. These ideal types of states are by Sørensen operationalized 
as Brazil, Russia, India and China or ‘the BRIC countries’ 14, varying in the degree to which they fit 
the ideals of the modern state type (Sørensen, 2009: 230).  
The modernizing states thus differ from the modern states, as they are not set in their pluralist 
modern tendencies, but when having an incitement to do so, compromise their own beliefs and 
values to increase their margin on influence within for instance institutions like the UN.  
We will in this project use the BRIC countries as general representative for some of the basic 
characteristics of the traditional pluralist modern ideal type with the reservation that it is necessary 
to generalize the countries into one ideal type even if they do not fit the characteristics in all 
aspects.  
The modern state ideal type cannot be seen as navigating with a ‘realist-rationalist’ pluralist bias in 
international society. Justice is perceived as communitative, and international law is perceived as 
the only thing withholding us from the anarchy of ‘natural law’. The first part and to some extent, 
                                                        
14 Goldmann Sachs introduced the acronym in 2003 to describe emerging economies 
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the second part, of the ICISS’ RtoP does align with this belief; stressing domestic responsibility, 
enforcement of international law based on sovereignty and ‘prevention’, rather than international 
responsibility and reaction. However, the ICISS report integrates the latter re-activist international 
responsibility and reaction, as a last resort and final operationalization of the former notions. This is 
believed to be of great threat to the modern perception, as any emphasis on ‘natural law’ is an 
authoritarian threat, a ‘Trojan Horse’ and ultimately, anarchy. It can thus be deduced that the 
modernizing states would emphasize already existing international law, in order to avoid the 
interventionist agenda and ‘chaos’ of the RtoP. Here, the ICISS’ report’s proposed authority of the 
UNSC arguably falls in good ground, as it maintains the existing UN charter (source), underlines 
sovereignty by veto power and further, already contains some referring points of humanitarian 
responsibility. Finally, the modernizing states would probably adhere to the first stages of RtoP, if 
at least not because of peer pressure, whilst they would rely on the UNSC to hamper the 
interventionist stage. 
 
5.2 The Postmodern State 
5.2.1 Central Characteristics and Historical Background 
The post-modern states have developed from the abovementioned modern states of the post World 
War II era, and thus must thus be understood in this context. The end of the World Wars, the 
beginning of the Cold War, and the increasing cooperation between the liberal ‘trading partners’ fed 
the tendencies of economic globalization and interdependency of the states. The respond of the 
modern European state to this interdependency, was to increase interstate cooperation by 
establishing secondary institutions and regional arrangements, such as the EU. This Sørensen 
interprets as being vital to the field of international relations as it involved significant changes in all 
the aspects important to sovereign statehood, namely government, nationhood and economy 
(Sørensen, 2001: 87). 
5.2.2 The Security Dilemma in the Postmodern State 
Due to the increased interstate cooperation between the post-modern states, physical conflicts 
between these are out of the question, and the classic security dilemma is hence somewhat 
irrelevant to this state type. Rather the postmodern states are organised in, what Sørensen refers to 
as a “coordinated security community” (Sørensen, 2001: 126). Instead there has been a transformation 
into new security challenges revolving around the issues of providing basic goods such as order, 
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justice, welfare and freedom (Sørensen, 2001: 126-127). In a postmodern state context, Sørensen 
argues, citizen rights are no longer necessarily connected to specific territorial borders (Sørensen, 
2001: 127/128), again exemplified through the EU.  
5.2.3 Postmodern States & Humanitarian Intervention 
The postmodern system of states is not one of non-intervention, Sørensen writes referring to the 
EU, but rather one of “regulated intervention that is continuously being developed” (Sørensen, 2001: 
158-159) into what he later describes as “mutual intervention” (Sørensen 2009: 232). So, the classic 
form of intervention as a threat against sovereignty is not considered relevant in a postmodern state 
context, as they do not submit to the traditional understanding of sovereignty and as it is 
unthinkable for the postmodern states to intervene each other in the classical sense. Instead it seems, 
the postmodern accept of and adaption to the use of multilevel governance and supranational 
institutions, most of which rest on a foundation of human rights principles, could prove to be 
influential factors shaping the attitude towards humanitarian intervention. 
The perception of reciprocity has also changed for postmodern states, from being one of fair and 
equal competition, as it is the case for modern states, to be a system of collaboration; redistributing 
resources across national borders. 
This way the postmodern states obviously lean towards solidarist principles in their approach to 
humanitarian intervention and the idea that basic human rights are (to be) secured by the state, 
possibly assisted (and controlled) by external actors. 
5.2.4 Discussion of the Postmodern Ideal Type 
The states of the EU are by Sørensen himself presented as the most obvious examples of 
postmodern states because of their compliance to multilevel governance and solidarist values 
(2001:158).  
The postmodern states of the EU, have widely agreed upon submitting to a form of multilevel 
governance and to the ideal of a ‘world society of states’ entailing human and distributive justice15.  
Sørensen (2009: 230) goes on to generalize not only the EU, but also most OECD countries as being 
postmodern due to their intense multilateral collaboration and integration, including the US despite 
its rather unilateral reputation (Sørensen, 2009: 230-232). In our operationalization of the postmodern 
state type we will focus upon the main postmodern actors constituting the UN in relation to the 
RtoP; those being the EU, the US and Canada. A deliberate trade-off between the unilateralism 
                                                        
15 Exemplified by humanitarian interventions, climate agreements, aid flow to developing countries etc. 
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characterizing the US and the multilateralism characterizing the postmodern states will be made to 
conduct the general theoretical analysis. 
The postmodern states have been identified as having solidarist points of departure, though possibly 
being hampered by their structure as electoral democracies; having to justify the prioritization of 
their actions in international society. The postmodern state of Canada was the original ‘champion’ 
of the RtoP and the ICISS’ report would probably likewise tend to be well-received by the 
postmodern states of international society. The postmodern states’ issue of dependence upon 
electoral sovereignty and thus, a rather domestic ethic, is not surprisingly well addressed by the 
RtoP, though. In accordance with the reality of postmodern states, RtoP places high priority on 
domestic responsibility, whilst still appealing to the normative ideal of ‘saving strangers’ through 
international cooperation and multilateral action – even though imaginably, in a much more 
comfortable and less committing degree, as the states here are not only being hampered by the 
consent of their electorates, but possibly also by the UNSC. 
 
5.3 The Post-Colonial State 
5.3.1 Central Characteristics and Historical Background 
As the post-colonial states are the result of the twentieth century decolonization they represent a 
new framework of how sovereign states develop, and accordingly make for an interesting study of 
statehood developments16 (Sørensen, 2001: 83). The development of the modern states being the result 
of a long process of statehood building through rather violent battles where the strongest ended up 
in power differs clearly from the rather abrupt postcolonial state development where no criteria of 
strength or cohesion put up. This difference is clearest in the ‘weak’ postcolonial states, often found 
in Africa, and Sørensen here points to a variation of influential factors: lack of nation building and a 
great division between government (or “ruler”) and nation being the most central points (Sørensen, 
2001: 83).  
The nationhood of the postcolonial states is often split into many different local communities or 
specific ethnic or religious groupings, which is where individuals turn for material or moral support; 
“(…) such systems comprehensively lack ‘the capacity to create any sense of moral community 
amongst those who participate in them, let alone those who are excluded’” (Sørensen, 2001: 85, quoted 
                                                        
16 It should be noted that what Sørensen characterises in his presentation of post-colonial states are what he concludingly refers to as 
“weak postcolonial states” (Sørensen, 2001: 86). What he emphasises is, that there are states that can be referred to as postcolonial 
that have managed quite a positive development of statehood, economy and nationhood (e.g. Taiwan and South Korea) 
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Clapham, 1996: 59). Thus, the state cannot be seen as representative for the nation, and the people of 
the state cannot be perceived as having a strong sense of citizenship. Rather the people of the state 
function as many nations within the state, each with affiliation to- and each representing different 
ethnic and cultural groups of society. This together seemingly makes the statehood an arena and a 
tool for those who are clever and fortunate enough, to be in a position from where they can direct 
and manage it. Such a state, Sørensen argues, does not make a strong foundation for protecting the 
security of its people and the state can in some cases even turn out to be, what the nation of the state 
needs protection from. 
5.3.2 The Postcolonial Security Dilemma 
As a fundament for the security dilemmas of the modern and postmodern states, is that the state 
provides a basic form of security for its people and that there is a notion of cohesion between state 
and nation (Sørensen, 2001: 74-91).  
However, as we learned in the previous paragraphs, this is not the case in the postcolonial states, 
which is why a re-thinking of the concept of security must be presented in order to understand the 
security dilemma of the postcolonial state.  
The sovereignty of the postcolonial states are basically not to be questioned by the international 
society; the states gained independence and sovereignty by the international society agreeing to give 
up the colonial empires and thus give rule to states, whether they be strong or weak, legitimate or 
not; the security of the postcolonial states is to a great extend shaped by the norms of the 
international society (Sørensen, 2001: 103 + 107). In other words, the international society (including 
the great powers) founded norms, which protected the sovereignty and legal existence of the 
(postcolonial) states, meant protection mainly the strong state elites and led new state leaders to 
foster the development of weak states, with a high level of insecurity for the people; as described 
above lack of social cohesion and uniting nation building put together with lack of fundamental 
state-provided welfare means intrastate conflict between ethnic and religious groups.  
Thus the issue of external threat of the borders of the postcolonial states is not present. The threat of 
security in postcolonial states is rather internal than external. So to sum up, maybe the security 
dilemma (or insecurity dilemma), is to begin with not so much a dilemma for the state, but for the 
nation(s) and the people of the state (which consequently becomes a threat for the security of the 
state because of the risk of failed states).  
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5.3.3 Postcolonial States & Humanitarian Intervention 
From what Georg Sørensen presents in his analysis and the historical background of the different 
state types it is rather evident that the international society has played, and continuously plays a 
vital part in the formation, existence and not least, the security of the postcolonial states. So to 
describe and analyse the postcolonial states’ view on humanitarian intervention, we have found it 
relevant and beneficial to first ask the question ‘how does the international society view the 
postcolonial states?’ 
The problem Georg Sørensen presents is that after the decolonization, the domestic political climate 
of the postcolonial states changed in a way that made it more of a challenge for the international 
society (donors, IMF, the World Bank) negotiating the conditions of interventions. The clash and 
problem was between the ‘internal’ interests of the states and the ‘external’ interests of the donors 
in question; the states were viewed more as part of the problem than part of the solution, and at the 
same time were amongst the main partners in negotiating (Sørensen, 2001: 112-113). 
This together led to a situation where the postcolonial states “strictly demanded to be treated as 
equals in the international system, enjoying the same principles of legal equality, non-intervention 
and rights to participate in international affaires on par with everybody else; and with no less 
rigidity demanded to be treated as unequals, with the entitlement to receive special benefits and 
privileges in the international economic and political system” (Sørensen, 2001: 105).  
The norms of non-intervention and reciprocity are hardly applicable to the postcolonial states, as the 
quality of statehood does not allow this (Sørensen, 2001: 155). With the postcolonial states’ 
dependency on the economic aid coming from the international society, the principle of the non-
intervention seems challenged. With the aid follows donor involvement in the postcolonial states’ 
internal affaires, which by nature can be seen a sort of intervention (even if not intervention in the 
classic sense). These types of interventions that are neither a classical example of intervention nor 
of non-intervention, Sørensen renames ‘negotiated interventions’. 
Legally the postcolonial states are equal to all other states in the international system of states. So 
on paper there is a very clear distinction between domestic and international. In terms of reality 
however, this distinction vanishes a little bit (Sørensen, 2001: 157) due to the postcolonial states’ 
dependence on the help of the international system. So the sovereign borders of the postcolonial 
states do not hold entities able to provide for their own security and the well being of their people. 
In the cases of the weakest states this entails the states in question to be placed under what Georg 
Sørensen calls “direct care of the international system”; namely humanitarian intervention (Sørensen, 
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2001: 157).   
The dilemma of “treat us as equals, but treat us a unequals” and the postcolonial states’ heavy 
dependency on international society blurs the extent to which one can isolate this ideal type from 
international society and call it either solidarism or pluralism.  
The notion of pluralistic sovereignty thus undeniably becomes challenged by the confession to 
distributive justice and ‘negotiated interventions’, and more importantly, the association between 
domestic and international realms. 
The postcolonial state seems to emphasize the importance of sovereignty through self-determination 
and non-interference, in order to defend itself from neo-patrimonial or authoritarian influence. 
However, the postcolonial states also seem positive towards postmodern states interfering with the 
institution of sovereignty, if it is to assist domestic development and capacity building. 
5.3.4 Discussion of the Postcolonial Ideal Type 
Sørensen (2001: 83-86) distinguishes between strong and weak states within this ideal type. He 
exemplifies strong states as Egypt and Central Asian states as Taiwan or South Korea, as 
postcolonial by their developing economies and their dealing with questions of sovereignty. 
However, we find that the development of these states are increasingly bordering to the 
modern(izing) ideal type of state, and therefore we choose to focus upon what Sørensen also puts 
his main focus on in his ideal type; the African (Sub-Saharan) weak postcolonial states. We will of 
course have the state of Sudan as the main example of a postcolonial state as the state of Sudan is 
the centre of our case study. However, when later referring to the open debates of the UN Security 
Council in which Sudan did not participate, we will use the state of Rwanda as an example of a 
weak postcolonial democracy and the state of Egypt as a strong authoritarian postcolonial state. 
5.4 Reflections on Methods and Research Conditions 
It is important to note that Georg Sørensen in his reflections upon the way in which his analysis is 
conducted, is aware that there is a necessary trade-off between contextualizing different states’ 
historical and current conditions, and the ability to generalize state types to an extent that permits 
the conduction of a general theoretical research (Sørensen, 2001: 72-74): “The ideal type is an attempt 
to capture core characteristics of a given type of state in its pure form. In doing so, the ideal type 
consciously disregards elements that are considered less important. This should not be mistaken for 
a failure to appreciate the concrete complexities of actual historical statehood”, Sørensen puts it 
himself (Sørensen, 2001: 73).  
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5.5 Concluding Framework of Analysis  
All three ideal types have now been presented. During the operationalization, it became clear that 
none of Sørensen’s ideal types deal with the institution of sovereignty as exclusive; this institution 
seems to have lost its prime position in the globalized world, where increased international 
centralized collaboration on issues such as climate is required and where an increase of human 
rights declarations inevitably has moved the solidity of sovereignty (Sørensen, 2001: 172). 
 
The above-identified ideal types will form the objects of our analysis of the different state responses 
to how to operationalize the RtoP in the case of Darfur.  
We will now proceed to an investigation of the concept of emerging norms and different state 
responses to the emerging norm of the RtoP before commencing with our analysis of the case study. 
6. The RtoP Becoming a Norm of Intervention? 
 
As we learned in the previous chapter, “If it can be shown that pluralist and solidarist principles of 
international society are not mutually exclusive, this would be a serious blow to the assumption that 
the problems of humanitarian intervention are insurmountable” (Knudsen, 1999: 17) 
Remembering the notion of bounded constructivism inherent in the English School line of thought, 
international real politics cannot be divided into mutually exclusive ontologies; solidarism must 
arise from and as response to what has traditionally been a society based on pluralist values; 
sovereignty and order are not exclusive to justice. Hence, we must try to understand justice and the 
related institutions, as incorporated and arising from the “normative machinery” of international 
society, where it builds upon different factors of influence and takes advantage of already existing 
institutions and norms (Knudsen, 1999: 401). We found further proof of this in the operationalization 
of our statehood ideal types, where we saw how the postmodern states can have solidarist 
tendencies in certain contexts, despite being built on pluralist ethics, how the modernizing states 
might in some cases adhere to solidarist agendas and how postcolonial states are wedged in between 
fully receiving either the grant of sovereignty or the grant of aid.  
 
Having gone through the different state types within the international society and their ontological 
foundation in the previous chapter, we will now proceed to shed light on the nature of norms within 
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the international society. We will use this context to ask ourselves who sets the agenda and how 
when norms are developed. We will further consider whether a norm of humanitarian intervention 
in case of mass atrocities has been legitimized and recognized through the international 
endorsement of RtoP as formulated in UN resolution 1674. We will do this by focusing on the 
General Assembly and the UNSC’s gathered consent on the paragraphs 138 and 139, and their 
following interpretations of these paragraphs. According to English School constitutive theorizing, 
the examination of the norm of RtoP might further contribute with an indication of the normative 
stand of international society of states in large.  
In conclusion, we will, along with our analytical findings from the theories presented in previous 
chapters, let this chapter to serve as a foundation of analysing the different states’ approach to and 
interpretation of the question of intervening humanitarianly in the conflict in Darfur. 
6.1. Norms 
 
 
“The English School relies on the idea that “states form an international society shaped by 
ideas, values, identities, and norms that are – to a greater or lesser extent – common to all” 
(Bellamy, 2005: 217). 
  
 
We will now introduce a more overall idea of ‘a norm in the international society’, before later 
going into depth with the question of whether we see a norm of humanitarian intervention in cases 
of mass atrocities developing behind the endorsement of the RtoP. 
In the ES chapter norms were defined as ‘customary implicit codes of social behaviour’. This 
definition implies that norms reflect a generally accepted code of practiced behaviour – of what is. 
However, norms can also be defined in a more ethical sense of what ought to be. A norm is thus not 
solely describing a prevailing practice, but can also define what should be practiced: ‘the proper 
behaviour’ (Thakur, 2011: 3-5).  However, this idea of a proper behaviour needs to stem from 
somewhere and so, “Norms neither arise nor are converted into laws and regimes by some 
mysterious process. They require identifiable agents” (Thakur, 2011: 132), meaning that contested 
norms, in order to be institutionalized in international society, must be held by agents/actors 
regarded as influential and legitimate, as norms practised by less influential/powerful actors will 
often not be adopted (Thakur, 2011: 3-6).  
                                                        
17 http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-926520-8.pdf 
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If the respect of a state in international society is considered desirable to obtain, another state of this 
society will be more willing to adopt a new norm – not as a result of domestic pressure to change 
state behaviour – but rather as a result of dependency on allies in the international society. This is 
often referred to as ‘the socialization effect’ of the international society (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 
903).  
The difference between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’ is therefore not always diverging: if a 
suggestion of what ought to be comes from or seems convincing to the powerful actors/states of the 
international society, it eventually probably will ‘be’. Norms do in general therefore not only shape 
human and state behaviour, but also “permits human beings to pursue goals, challenge assertions 
and justify actions” (Thakur, 2011: 3).  
The norm of focus in this project is the norm of humanitarian intervention in cases of mass 
atrocities, proposed to the international society through the RtoP. This norm, to some extent, puts 
forth a moral proposition of what ought to be and has been presented earlier on, as challenging to 
some of the most profound existing norms and institutions of international society.  
The UN and its Charter arguably constitute the norms prevailing the strongest in international 
society of states, as they “encapsulates and articulates the organizing principles” on which the 
international society relies. The UN and its Charter thus act as the main custodians of the 
institutions constituting world order, as they portray the agreed upon consensus on the prevailing 
norms and rules that structures and maintains order in the international society (Thakur, 2011: 87). 
However, as norms are essentially constructs, these can change and adapt to maintain what is or 
ought to be; namely the order of the international society. Radical norm shifts will thus indicate 
more fundamental normative changes or evolutions of the institutions that is supposed constitute 
world order. 
6.2. A UN Norm of Non-Intervention? 
By presenting a norm of humanitarian intervention, the idea of RtoP seems to challenge the norm of 
non-intervention, which traditionally has followed the institution of sovereignty articulated by the 
UN and its Charter.  
The norm of non-intervention has helped regulating the interaction of states, weak or strong, on 
equal basis. Even if sovereignty to a certain extent, always has been challenged in differing ways by 
wars, economic interventions and development of international collaborations and supranational 
institutions, modern society is built upon the notion of sovereign statehood as the organizing 
principle (Thakur, 2011: 87-90) from the time of the peace of Westphalia to the affirmed UN Charter 
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Article 2 (1), reading “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members”. Further Article 2(7) writes, “Nothing (…) in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state”.  
However, it can be argued that a country when signing the Charter, conditions its sovereignty; the 
restrictions of Article 2(7) can be set aside in accordance with the collective enforcement of Chapter 
VII, “Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”: 
“Article 41: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force 
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures”. Traditionally, the UN Charter has always focused on external 
aggressions as threat to collective peace and security, like this enforcing the norm of non-
intervention (Thakur, 2011:118). However, the scope of what constitutes threats in contemporary 
globalized international society seems to have been widened due to factors like the ‘war on terror’, 
internal mass atrocities and ‘spillover effects’ making a the threat to one state a threat to all states 
and thus making dealing with the threats a matter of international collaboration. The question of 
which matters “are essentially” domestic and thus under the application of Chapter VII, have in this 
relation recently been questioned by especially the postmodern states, and has proven to ultimately 
be questions of judgment18. The case of Somalia19 for example, proved that the UNSC could deal 
with domestic crises. However, this case still differs significantly from the establishment of a 
universal standard to protect the life of peoples in the most extreme cases of mass atrocities, despite 
lack of sovereign state consent – which is essentially what the RtoP proposes (Thakur, 2011: 118-126). 
 
6.3. The Endorsement of the RtoP Norm  
It has been argued that it was ‘postmodern advocacy’ and diplomacy, focusing on modifications of 
emphasizing preventive efforts and capacity building, as well as increasing focus on how to restrict 
the application of RtoP, that gathered the international society’s consent to include the RtoP in the 
World Summit negotiations (Bellamy, 2009: 73-80). And when the over 170 heads of government 
participated in the discussions leading to the World Summit Outcome Document carrying the 
paragraphs 138 and 139, said heads of government, through the General Assembly, agreed to 
                                                        
18 In the 1990s the UNSC authorized several interventions under Chapter VII, despite that these were often sent 
in response to threats against human security rather than collective security. 
19 The UNSC authorized an intervention in Somalia after collapse of state authority and threats of violence, 
instability and spillover effects. 
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endorse the RtoP (White-Burke, 2011) – seemingly leading to the endorsement of the norm of 
protecting peoples, if necessary without state consent.  
 
Paragraphs 138 and 139: 
“138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. (…) The international community should, as appropriate, 
encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an 
early warning capability. 
 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, 
to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In 
this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation 
with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national 
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States 
build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.” 
 
As described, a norm should often define either existing or normative practices of behaviour that 
ought to be. To find out exactly which existing norms the RtoP entails and builds upon, and which 
norms of it that may be new, we will now briefly trace and discuss the origins of the paragraphs. It 
will be argued that the paragraphs 138 and 139 are already somewhat entrenched in existing 
practices and international law, and that they do not carry any criteria to follow the parts of it that 
may actually be new.  
 
6.4. Traces 
We will now look further into the two paragraphs 138 and 139, in order to trace from where the 
practices proscribed stemmed and hence, thereby also determine the points of challenge. 
Paragraph 138, which represent the expectation of how a state should act and care for its 
population, is compatible with the traditional pluralist perception of the institution of sovereignty 
functioning also as an ethical responsibility. Thus it does not conflict with any fundamental 
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institutions: contemporary society is already embedded in norms and rules maintaining this view on 
sovereignty, for example in Article 2(7). From the previously presented English School debate, it 
can further be deduced that the paragraphs 138 and 139 also comply with the Grotian ‘international 
law’-understanding. The duty and right of the international society to maintain and assist 
international law if a state fails to do so can be found in the already existing Article 1 of the Geneva 
Conventions (Bellamy, 2010:160)20. The Geneva Conventions portray rationalist-pluralist notions by 
referring to humanitarian law as a responsibility of states, and any international law as one of 
communitative justice; the international society must (solely) collectively ensure that international 
law is maintained equal for all. Herein, sovereignty is contingent upon respect of international law, 
but as this is essentially also based on sovereignty, Vincent says “so human-rights-talk is power-
talk” (Vincent, 1986: 123). The first parts of the paragraphs are thus “best understood as a 
reaffirmation and codification of already existing norms” (Bellamy, 2010:160).  
Despite that many declarations such as the above-mentioned and as another example the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, have been long-time existing, paragraph 139 attempts to lead the 
international society beyond international law and previous declarations by stating that “we are 
prepared to take collective action (…) should peaceful means be inadequate…”; here arguably 
trying to establish a course of collective legitimate action, which will illegitimate the sovereignty of 
any state committing mass atrocities towards its people. This sentence thus proposes not only 
communitative justice, but also a form of distributive justice and moral imperative when states fall 
below the bottom line of minimum humanitarian standards. Like this, the norm of humanitarian 
intervention in the case of mass atrocities is attempted institutionalized through the paragraphs, by 
gathering before rather disparate, less recognized norms and practices of behaviour on equal ground 
with the one of sovereignty. It is thus within this paragraph 139 that a non-recognized ‘universal’ 
norm of intervention, based a ‘solidarist’ duty of reaction when basic human rights are not upheld, 
is proposed and contests prevailing norms in international society.  
 
However, it will now be shown that the postmodern states’ advocacy and attempt to move 
international society beyond existing law in the pursuit of establishing a framework for 
humanitarian intervention, was significantly compromised and downplayed. Below, we will seek to 
                                                        
20 ”The obligation to respect and to ensure respect for humanitarian law is a two-sided obligation, for it calls on States both “to 
respect” and “to ensure respect”. “To respect” means that the State is under an obligation to do everything it can to ensure that the 
rules in question are respected by its organs as well as by all others under its jurisdiction. “To ensure respect” means that States, 
whether engaged in a conflict or not, must take all possible steps to ensure that the rules are respected by all, and in particular by 
parties to conflict.” Article 1, the Geneva Conventions 
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understand the preconditions of the formulation of the paragraphs, as well the operative nature of 
these. This understanding will be divided as following; first, we will shed light upon the relevant 
preconditions affecting the response of the states of the international society to the ICISS report’s 
proposition of the RtoP. After this, we will show how these responses led to significant 
modification and indeterminacy of the paragraphs 138 and 139. Thirdly, we will evaluate upon the 
operative potential of the norm of RtoP based on the above, and concludingly, we will look at 
different state types’ interpretation of the paragraphs after the World Summit. 
 
6.5. Leading Up to the World Summit 
Some postmodern states argued in the beginning of the millennium that the norms of the human 
rights institution increasingly had come to constitute order in contemporary international society, 
where the biggest threats were conceived to lay within domestic crises, and where sovereignty and 
territorial boarders already had been somewhat transcended due to globalization and citizen-state 
interaction – resulting in the need of a framework placing the right of the individual rather than the 
one of the state at the centre (Thakur, 2011: 4, 120). Postmodern states have arguably often acted as 
legitimate ideational norm setters of ‘what ought to be’ in international society, and these ideas 
have often had constitutive influence21. However, the ICISS report on RtoP met much resistance 
when it was put forth in 2001.  
A range of factors can be argued to have contributed to this reluctant response on the report. Most 
of these factors seem to challenge the legitimacy of the postmodern states to act as norm setters 
putting forth moral imperatives of behaviour in international society, though. One factor in 
particular worth presenting as crucial to the international society’s reluctant response to the ICISS 
report seems to be the alleged ‘war on terror’ in the post 9/11 climate; the war on terror overall 
seemed to be an event, which ended up – on the principle of humanitarian intervention – leading to 
Western lack of legitimacy and postcolonial and modernizing skepticism; making it a hard start for 
the ICISS’ proposed report on a ‘responsibility to protect’, which was released only a few months 
after the terror attack on 9/11 in 2001 (Thakur, 2011: 135). The ‘war on terror’ after this attack and in 
particular, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, thus had several consequences for how the states of 
international society came to perceive the threats to security.  
Whilst the postmodern states increasingly focused on the threats of internal crises far away, their 
reasoning for the intervention of Iraq, which did not seem to keep tight, and the coalition of 
                                                        
21 See page 23, where it is described by Bull how ex, colonialism became an accepted institution of constituting order 
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postmodern states leading the intervention’s (retroactive) use of humanitarian intervention-language 
and ICISS’ RtoP principles to justify their actions, resulted in the modernizing and postcolonial 
states increasingly beginning to utter concerns of the RtoP report, which if operationalized arguably 
could lead to and legitimize interventionism and self-interests (Thakur, 2011: 135). This despite the 
fact that the RtoP was never meant to be seen in the light of nor relating to the intervention of Iraq 
and the war on terror (Thakur, 2011: 135).  
 
6.6. Modifications & the Right Authority 
The time frame and specific events like the war on terror can be defined as influencing – though 
differently – leading up to the World Summit. Generally, it can be argued that the postmodern 
states’ increasing recognition of human justice as complimenting to international order, resulted in a 
strong advocacy for the RtoP as a needed framework of authority to compliment existing 
international law and structures. The postcolonial and modernizing states’ concerns of “subjective” 
interventionist abuses of the RtoP had been increased by the war on terror, and thus their focus was 
not on widening the decisive power of RtoP, but rather on specifying and narrowing it: the 
modernizing states by emphasizing prevailing international law and the authority of the UNSC, as 
the sole possibility of legitimizing any intervention, and the postcolonial states through emphasizing 
the role of regional organisations, as counteract to the centralized power of UNSC, based on a 
postcolonial notion of self-determination (WFM). These criteria were hardly uniform and highly 
expressed the differing security concerns of the two state types; both being rather pluralist-inspired.  
 
6.7. Indeterminacy 
It was inevitable that the original ICISS report would have to be compromised in order to 
encompass all the differing demands of all state types, whilst still respecting a narrow approach to 
limit abuse, in order to (rhetorically) unify international society behind the endorsement of the 
paragraphs. Even if the initial concept of RtoP seems to have been specified and narrowed down, 
paragraph 138 and 139 also seem to have entailed all the different demands of modification of the 
state types of the international society. The line reading “we are prepared to take collective action, 
in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII (and) relevant regional organizations as appropriate” in paragraph 139, 
portrays the demanded modifications or criteria of authority. However, by also stating, “we are 
prepared (…) on a case-by-case basis”, the meaning is left unbinding and open for interpretation to 
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all state types within the UNSC. Further, the postmodern states, which emphasized the need for an 
effective framework of intervention complimenting the mechanisms of the UNSC, seem to have 
been granted attention in “timely and decisive manner, we are prepared (…), through the Security 
Council”, which can also be interpreted as allowing ‘moral action’ outside the UNSC, if necessary. 
And so, the questions of ‘how’ and ‘when’ still remains open for normative debate and judgment, 
and highlights indeterminacy; “indeterminacy is produced by a combination of uncertainty about 
what is expected, disagreements about what ought to be expected, and an interest in preserving 
flexibility for the future” (Bellamy 2010: 162, 262).  
6.8. Resolution 1674 
The endorsement of the RtoP in paragraphs 138 and 139 was put up for reaffirmation as a provision 
in an UNSC resolution, as the UN Charter (Article 25) writes, “the Members of the United Nations 
agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council”. The final commitment to the 
paragraphs was thus to be reaffirmed by the authority ultimately responsible for its implementation, 
and came to reflect a process of legalization (Burke-White, 2011)22.  
However, as the paragraphs were only to be reaffirmed, they contained the same indeterminacy as 
described above – and this seemingly came to be its main asset; by its indeterminate nature, the 
states of the UNSC finally agreed to reaffirm the paragraphs 138 and 139, in the UNSC resolution 
1674, after 6 months of intense negotiation where Algeria, China, Brazil and Russia argued highly 
against the endorsement (Jensen, 2007: 63). Concluding, the UNSC joined the General Assembly’s 
endorsement, but by merely ‘reaffirming’ the previous commitment, the different state types’ 
reservations were inherent in the final resolution as well and stood unaddressed.   
 
6.9 A Norm Shift?  
When the RtoP was endorsed at the 2005 World Summit as ‘appropriate behaviour’, and when 
those who were to act on it again reaffirmed this in 2006, something could indicate that a normative 
shift had taken place. The international society had adopted ‘new standards of behaviour’ on the 
concept of human justice set forth by the postmodern states – and despite this new practice of the 
RtoP being of ‘what ought to be’ rather than ‘what is’ – normative preparation is often seen as the 
precondition of any prepared operationalization (Thakur, 2011: 3, 4). According to optimists, the norm 
of non-intervention was seemingly no longer taken for granted as a safeguard for populations – it 
                                                        
22 The paragraphs reaffirmed in resolution 1674, are more to be understood as ‘a political commitment’ or norm in need of advance, 
more than a binding legal rule though, which the “case-by-case” also reflects (Burke-White, 2011).   
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rather seemed as if the international society of states recognized that sovereignty was something, 
which the states had to qualify for (Thakur, 2011: 3). What we see with the endorsement of paragraphs 
138 and 139 could thus be an indication of an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention in case 
of mass atrocities operationalized by the concept of RtoP.  
However, as the paragraphs endorsed at the World Summit had an unbinding and indeterminate 
nature, this emerging norm seems to be contingent on the ability of international society to move 
beyond existing state practices and reach consensus on judging how and when to intervene.  
Whilst it can be argued that the statehood types of international society when assigned to the RtoP, 
assigned not only to the norm, but also to the moral solidarist framework and values behind it put 
forth by the postmodern states, they agreed to this submission only because it carried no obligations 
of moving state practices beyond existing norms. Of these existing norms prevailing in the 
paragraphs, the most constitutive has been determined to be the one of sovereignty; clearly entailing 
a clash with any judgement of intervention. The influence of the postmodern states to dictate norms 
and herein, the new norm of humanitarian intervention carried by the RtoP, could therefore hardly 
be defined as anything else than ‘soft’; rendering the idea of an implementable consensus doubtable 
(Thakur, 2011:X). 
Concludingly, the intended commitment to act in preventing mass atrocities seemed to gather the 
states of international society behind the same normative pledge. However, this commitment was 
only affirmed by being broad enough to encompass the demands and reservations made by the state 
types of international society, which arguably have resulted in a ‘vagueness’ of and ad hoc-
approach of how and when to the norm. 
 
To determine what consequences this vagueness of the endorsed norm of RtoP might have, we will 
now look further into how the state types, having endorsed the indeterminate paragraphs, 
interpreted these, in order to later, be able to relate and compare said state types’ response to the 
operationalization of the RtoP in Darfur. 
6.10. UNSC Open Debates 
After the reaffirmation of the endorsement, the opinions of the UNSC were debated during a UNSC 
open debate on protection of civilians. This debate was to constitute a forum every six months for 
the member states to express their opinion about the RtoP, and served to keep the promise of further 
debating the paragraphs up to the 2009 General Assembly debate on RtoP (ICRtoP). The debates 
thus highly express the states’ interpretations and post-considerations of the commitment.  
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We will now look into the first debate conducted after resolution 1674, in order to examine the 
depth of the consensus on the norm. The width of this debate and thus, the depth of the consensus in 
between the state types, will enable us to understand the operative scope of RtoP as endorsed in the 
paragraphs 138 and 139, which will be analysed in the next chapter in the case of Darfur.  
Following is thus an account of the statements of the different states at the UNSC open debates on 
protection of civilians. The states are divided into the different categories accordingly with what has 
been done in chapter 4, where each state type was sought operationalized. Despite resolution 1674 
having been endorsed by both the General Assembly and the UNSC, the open debates of the UNSC 
will display significant lack of consensus on where to place emphasis in the paragraphs; whether to 
place it on the endorsed already existing practices of international society or the new assumed 
legitimized norm of humanitarian intervention in case of mass atrocities. 
 
6.10.1 The Postmodern States 
As stated earlier in this chapter, the idea behind the RtoP norm originally stemmed from 
postmodern states of the international society, who, it was argued, to a great extend already abided 
by the norm of humanitarian intervention. The RtoP seemed to appeal to the post-modern states for 
several reasons: firstly, it represented a possibility of acting on ‘spillover’ effects, secondly, because 
it relied on collective action of the international society, it arguably eased the burden on the 
individual countries, and thirdly, the precautionary principle that “any violence in question” would 
have to be of such serious nature that the risks associated with intervention should be contemplated 
(RtoP:FAQ), appealed to any need for domestic justification.  
Thus, as it would be expected, the postmodern states fully embraced the norm, and did not focus so 
much on emphasizing or debating deliberate parts of its content, but rather underlining that it 
overall represented an agreement for which implementation was soon expected. The U.K. stated: “a 
basic agreement on a balanced vision of what is now called the responsibility to protect (…) it 
would not be unusual for the Security Council to refer to that notion, because it commanded a 
consensus among our heads of State or Government”. Spain further noted: “The outcome document 
of September’s General Assembly summit (…) set this concept out as a major advance in the action 
of the international community, and we cannot fail to welcome this.”  
On the question of the interventionist agenda of the RtoP, which was addressed carefully, the US 
noted, “We would like to stress (…) that the primary responsibility for protecting civilians lies with 
States and their Governments and that international efforts should complement Government efforts 
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rather than assume responsibility for them” (UNSCOD23); like this approaching a multilateral stand 
to the endorsing of the core of RtoP.  
6.10.2 The Modernizing States 
The modernizing states have been presented as carrying a rather ‘Hobbesian security dilemma’. The 
‘abuse’ of the norm of intervention for the sake of promoting and preserving domestic interests of 
the intervening state had been increased by the war on terror, and thus their focus were not on 
widening the decisive power of RtoP, but rather on specifying and narrowing it to the prevailing 
practices of sovereignty and non-intervention in accordance with international law. The 
modernizing states thus still focused on narrowing the scope of the norm, enforcing international 
law and protecting the sovereignty of member states. 
China stated in the open debate on protection of civilians that “… efforts to protect civilians (…) 
should not violate the principles enshrined in the Charter; nor should they infringe upon the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States”, thus placing emphasis on the domestic 
responsibility of a state and the international society’s responsibility to assist international law, 
whilst neglecting the new norm of intervention to become contingent only upon existing UN 
framework.  
Russia reaffirmed this position by saying, “We believe that it is clearly premature to advance that 
concept in Security Council documents”; thus stating that the concept of RtoP’s responsibility to 
react (with humanitarian interventions), should not be of focus.  
Brazil emphasized that “The United Nations was not created to disseminate the notion that order 
should be imposed by force (…) collective action (…) must by agreed by and implemented through 
the Security Council” (UNSCOD). Modernizing states thus underlined prevailing international law 
and they did not seem to adhere to neither a solidarist discourse nor a solidarist course of action. 
6.10.3 The Postcolonial States 
The division in between authoritarian regimes and weaker democracies of postcolonial states seem 
reasonable when examining the statements of the open debate. Egypt stated “The Council should 
not expand its authority by establishing general policies for dealing with humanitarian issues and 
human rights (…) Thus, we are concerned at the mention in the report and the draft resolution of the 
possible role of the Security Council in legislating and taking action under the so-called 
responsibility to protect” – focusing on the threat of expanding authority to the UNSC in matters 
being essentially normative. Algeria went further by neglecting resolution 1674, emphasizing that 
                                                        
23 UNSCOD = United Nations Security Council Open Debate. UNSCOD is the reference of use from this point on in the project 
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no final consensus had been reached: “We recall that the September summit mandated the General 
Assembly to continue the debate on that concept (…) about which there is still no unanimity within 
the international community and whose parameters still need to be rigorously defined.”  
Rwanda, which can be characterized as a weak postcolonial state, on the other hand, emphasized 
the need for external assisting capacity to the AU; “we support all courses of action envisaged in the 
outcome resolution, including (…) to act in a timely and decisive manner through the Security 
Council in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII (…) The safety of civilian 
populations (…) is the very foundation of the legitimacy (…) Empowering relevant bodies such as 
the Security Council to take up that challenge is the first step forward, which we cannot afford to 
overlook”, and was largely backed up by South Africa and Tanzania (UNSCOD).  
It seems that with the division of postcolonial states into strong authoritarian states and the weak 
democracies, we can see that the first group leans towards a modernizing way of arguing and the 
latter leans towards the postmodern arguments, but perceivably due to other circumstances than 
those of the postmodern states; it could be argued that the postcolonial states arguing for the norm 
either due it do to the socializing process mentioned earlier, or due to an actual need of external 
help (note that the example of this paragraph was the state of Rwanda). 
This was underlined under previous negotiations as well, where the African Group of the UN 
emphasized that the RtoP was seen as being close to a direct instrument of Western international 
society to legitimately deal with the issues (and interests) of the African continent (WFM). Whilst 
the capacity building aspect of this ‘intervening agenda’ was widely accepted, the African Group 
also underlined the principle of self-determination and importance of international collaboration 
through regional organizations; potentially stemming from a lack of African states in the UNSC, as 
Egypt and Algeria also emphasized. It is worth noting that the AU even before the final UN 
endorsement of RtoP had incorporated elements of its commitment in their own charter through the 
Ezulwini Consensus. This consensus contained the element that the proposed authority for 
legitimising RtoP-reaction (being the UNSC) in matters related to the AU’s member states, would 
need to seek consultation and consent of the AUSC first, in order to obtain authoritative 
legitimacy24.  
 
                                                        
24 Ezulwini Consensus: ”Since the General Assembly and the Security Council are often far from the scenes of 
conflict and may not be in a position to undertake (…) proper appreciation (…) it is imperative that Regional 
Organizations, in areas of proximity to conflicts, are empowered…”(AU Executive Council, 7th Extraordinary 
Session, 7-8 March 2005. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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6.11 Differing Interpretations & the Status of the Paragraphs 
Despite the endorsement at the 2005 World Summit and the reaffirmation in resolution 1674, the 
legal character of the paragraphs obviously remained vague. Several of the modernizing states like 
China, Russia and Brazil emphasized that international legal rules are the only binding codes of 
conduct and that these are only created through international treaties, principles of international law 
or customary law; state practice backed up by opinio juris25 (Burke-White, 2011). Further, some of 
these states, in the excerpted statements above, also emphasized that the RtoP should remain in 
debate until the 2009 General Assembly Debate on RtoP. The modernizing states thus emphasize 
laws as codes of behaviour restricting the extent to which the society of states becomes anarchy 
governed by normative dissonance: a point of view based on a cultural relativism rather than 
universalism, in accordance with their presented security dilemma and pluralist ontology. 
 
The postmodern states and some African states gave more significance to the reached endorsement, 
though. Tanzania expressed that “The consensus reached on the responsibility to protect (…) is a 
useful basis for the further development and refinement of norms and practices related to the 
national and international (…) responsibility” (UNSCOD); expressing the perceived legality of mere 
consensus on norms in international society. It can be argued though, on the basis of the presented 
theory that several of the weaker postcolonial states’ confession to the norm did not demand much, 
as they would probably never be ‘the interveners’, and as they already had agreed to a sort of 
intervention by receiving (conditional) aid from the postmodern countries. Hence, some of the 
postcolonial countries’ acceptance and adherence to the norm should probably rather be interpret as 
part of ‘the socialization effect’ and thus, a wish of recognized legitimacy as ‘a good member of 
international society’, rather than an actual compliance of values according with the norm. 
 
The postmodern countries’ acceptance of the norm as binding is opposite the postcolonial 
countries’, not based on peer pressure or a wish of legitimacy, though. The postmodern states were 
originally the ones presenting the norm and the moral foundations of it, and thus their incitement to 
embrace it stems from their belief in a solidarist ‘world society’; principally governed by moral 
imperatives and norms of what ought to be. Moreover the postmodern states’ internal precepts of 
governance already comply with the norm of RtoP and the priority it proposes, and thus the 
                                                        
25 Widespread acceptance of the pratictice in question as obligatory 
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postmodern countries sole problem seems to be, to make other statehood types adhere to their 
normative beliefs.  
The different interpretations among opponents and proponents of the RtoP correspond highly to the 
two examined stands of both solidarism and pluralism, and their respective ascription to the 
significance of norms and institutions. However, it has also been proved that the different security 
concerns of the statehood types as presented, affects the extent to which they adhere to one ideal or 
the other.  
To sum up: 
The postmodern states: 
- Already abided by the norm 
- Found the norm good for dealing with the new nature of threats that transcend borders 
- Applauded the notion of collective action in accordance with the nature of the system multilateral 
governance prevailing in the system of postmodern states 
- The nature of the violence that should be acted on would be serious enough to justify intervention 
to their domestic electorates 
 
The modernizing states: 
- Saw the norm as a tool for the intervening states to promote self-interests 
- Sought to narrow the scope of the norm  
- Had as their as their main concern to protect state sovereignty and enforce international law 
 
The postcolonial states: 
- Were split in two on the question into the strong authoritarian states and the weak democracies 
- The strong state argued the more modernizing side of the debate; namely non-intervention and a 
narrower scope of the norm 
- The weak democracies seemed to argue the same side as the postmodern states however for 
different reasons of need for external assistance and the socializing process of the international 
society 
 
SIB 21.2   
Roskilde University   Group 9 
 
 55
 
6.12. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we started out by introducing theories of norms in international society. From this, it 
was argued that the postmodern states of the West to some extent had lost legitimacy as central 
norm setters in international society and thus, that the rise and consolidation of norms seemingly in 
this context had to be agreed upon jointly by all statehood types of international society in order to 
reach consensus and enable operationalization. We stated earlier that norm language can help 
indicate the normative position of international society in large. The assigned effect of socialization 
processes has in this chapter seemingly resulted in vagueness and indeterminacy of the (‘soft’) 
norm of intervention of the RtoP. From this we could, using the RtoP norm endorsement as an 
indicator, point to the fact that the Western postmodern states have not only lost legitimacy, but also 
that modernizing states; namely the BRIC countries (which have not seemed willing to truly submit 
to the moral framework of RtoP put forth), have gained legitimacy as powerful actors in 
international society. 
The postmodern states were in their advocacy thus careful to embed the RtoP in already existing 
UNSC practices and international law, to promote their cause, which led to the paragraphs 138 and 
139 mainly being based on already existing practices.  
And like this, the norm of humanitarian intervention became conditioned: the part of the RtoP 
norm, which may provide new practice, is supposedly hampered by the modernizing states’ position 
in the UNSC. So whilst the recognition of a norm of humanitarian intervention arguably exists – 
and has reached ‘institutionalization’ by having been incorporated into the “normative machinery” 
of the UN – it is by the main parts of international society, perceived to only exist on the two 
conditions that the UNSC can agree on when and how to act; meaning that reaching consensus on 
when the international society needs to react to respective crises, how it is to be acted upon – by 
international law legitimizing or illegitimating sovereignty – and most importantly, that it indeed 
comprises a mass atrocity.  
The norm of the RtoP was presented by the postmodern states as what should be. Herein, lay a wish 
of not only promoting a norm of human justice, but also a wish of promoting the institution of 
human rights as constitutive to world order. However, the constitutive effect of this largely 
solidarist vision has been proved to be highly reliant upon the consensus of other states types of the 
international society on this norm and institutional its roots.  
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The modernizing states, arguably representing the greatest challenge, due to their position in the 
UNSC, have been presented as valuing the institution of sovereignty as the prime: turning an 
operationalization of the ‘reactive part’ of paragraph 139 contested and ‘testing’. The discussion of 
primary institutions was laid out not as one of what is, but rather as one of what will be: the 
institution of sovereignty in the traditional sense has arguably turned redundant with Sørensen’s 
own verdict of the modern ideal state type as belonging to the 20th century. So, in a world which is 
reliant on “we do have (…) “systems with imperfections and limitations (…) international 
cooperation where there is no global government, only states mostly pursuing their own national or 
regional interests.” (Thakur, 2011: 127).  
We will proceed to investigating how the states of international society responded to the 
operationalization of the RtoP principles in the case of the mass atrocities in Darfur as indicators of 
whether an international norm of humanitarian intervention is emerging.   
 
7. Analysing the Case of Darfur  
 
The overall question asked in this project was: “Taking our point of departure in the different 
responses of the states of the international society to the question of how to operationalize the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ in the case of the crisis in the Darfur region, can we see indications of a 
developing international norm of humanitarian intervention in cases of mass atrocities?” This 
question has served as the problem formulation of this project.  
 
In order to give an answer to this problem formulation, we have outlined our theoretical foundation 
of the English School, wherein we presented normative divide between the pluralists and the 
solidarists. We concluded that the pluralists, as their point of departure believe that state 
sovereignty is the primary unchallengeable institution of international society and that humanitarian 
intervention would undermine this international order.  The solidarists on the other hand, found 
individuals to be the central agents of the international society and justice for said individuals to be 
the prime concern of international order thus accepting interventions with humanitarian purposes.  
Having put forth, as we did, a criticism of the English School stating that the strict divide of state 
sovereignty and humanitarian intervention into two clashing ideal types was too narrow a scope to 
give a satisfactory answer to our problem formulation, we presented the state typology of Georg 
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Sørensen. We used this state typology to understand different state type approaches to the 
normative divide presented in the English School framework. We operationalized different 
international actors to different state types in order to later understand the approach said actors had 
in the sovereignty or human justice-debate of RtoP. Two main responses and interpretations to the 
concept of RtoP were emphasized; there were those who perceived it as a legitimate, very needed 
framework to prevent and respond to mass atrocities, and there were those who perceived this same 
framework as a threat or attempt of postmodern Western states to legitimize intervention even 
without a broad consensus. 
However, the endorsement of the RtoP norm still did take place in the paragraphs 138 and 139 in 
UNSC resolution 1674. Whether the different state types would submit to the solidarist values of 
this new norm, was however, strongly doubted. Now we will proceed, attempting to understand the 
different state reactions and will to move beyond existing practices through the operationalization 
of RtoP in Darfur.  
 
We will therefore go on to contextualise our findings from the previous chapters with the case of 
the operationalization of the RtoP in the Darfur conflict, and analyse how the different states 
reacted. We do this to investigate the interrelationship between what the states endorsing the RtoP 
norm agreed to and how they acted, when it came to the operationalization of the norm; in other 
words, we look at what is expressed as proposed reaction of the international society to the mass 
atrocities in Darfur, how the states acted and respectively the reasons they themselves gave for this, 
as well as complimentary perspectives on the states’ behaviour.   
 
We will now look into the AU-UN efforts to provide human security in Darfur. 
As we have previously learned the RtoP proscribes that the primary responsibility to protect 
civilians lies with the state. When the state fails this responsibility, the responsibility to protect the 
population of the state is transferred to the international society and in particular, the UN and the 
various regional organizations.  
Partly due to a Western loss of legitimacy however, it seems that the consensus of the amount of 
responsibility that the international society is supposed to take on, is highly contested: We 
previously determined that the RtoP is much reliant on the answers of the states of the UNSC to 
‘when’ and ‘how’ it should be implemented.  
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The norm of RtoP thus influences, but do not determine states’ actions in the UN. Especially, 
paragraph 139 of UNSC resolution 1674, seems to be nothing more than a ‘soft’ norm at best.  
So, in order to understand the operative nature and potential of the RtoP norm in cases of mass 
atrocities, we now go on to a chronologically progressing analysis of the process of operationalizing 
the RtoP norm in Darfur.  
 
We will first analyse the conflict with the perspective of Georg Sørensen’s state types, presenting 
Sudan as a postcolonial state in order to contextually understand the ‘existing sovereignty’ of 
Sudan. Here, we analyse the failure of the Darfur Peace Agreement as a political solution to the 
crisis.  
We then go on to a chronological analysis of the process of the international society’s 
operationalization of the RtoP norm. Here we first analyse the AU’s deployment of the African 
Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS), the role – or lack of it – the international society played in this 
mission. After this we look at how the UN/AU hybrid mission, the UNAMID, came about and how 
the strong actors of the international society, China and the US, reacted and compromised for this to 
happen. Finally, we sum up on what we have found throughout this chapter and the previous about 
the different states’ reaction to the RtoP norm and how this was expressed in the case of Darfur. 
This together should enable us to afterwards give an answer to our stated problem formulation.  
7.1. The Postcolonial State of Sudan and the Conflict in the Darfur Region 
We have previously described the state of Sudan, as a clear example of what Georg Sørensen sets 
forth as a postcolonial state in his state typology. We characterized the postcolonial ‘security 
dilemma’ as more of an ‘insecurity dilemma’ in the sense that it was in fact the state itself that 
constituted the greatest threat to the people of the state. In the case of the conflict in Darfur this 
condition is obvious, as the government of Sudan supported the Janjaweed rebel group conducting 
the massacres on the people in Darfur.  
These factors and preconditions and in particular, the ruling minority elite – which the Sudanese 
government can be characterized as – insisting on absolute supremacy and systematic deprivation of 
any resources that might empower other regions (Traub, 2010: 4) are important factors in 
understanding and analysing the respond and attitude of the government of Sudan in the 
operationalization of the RtoP.  
Indications of how Sudan acted as a state were confirmed in the 2005 House of Commons report 
“Darfur, Sudan: The responsibility to protect”, which stated that the main aim of the Sudanese 
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Government was to maintain power and crush rebels without any concern for the consequences of 
the civilians (House of Commons, 2005:19-21).  
To draw on the theory presented earlier in this project, it is obvious that in the conflict in Darfur, the 
government of Sudan was obviously not a protector for its people, but rather an example of the 
described ’insecurity dilemma’ which can be found in postcolonial states, wherein (authoritarian) 
state and peoples are coercively separated.  
It was assumed that the operationalization of RtoP in Sudan would entail difficulties due to the 
missing consensus of international society on the norm. However, it seems here, as if the difficulties 
of operationalization begins even before this; the RtoP proscribes in paragraph 138 that the 
respective state should be the prime protector for its people. This however, constitutes a problem in 
postcolonial context, where the state may be what the people need protection from. The RtoP thus 
present a problem to the postcolonial state types, which furthermore can be seen as the states 
needing this framework of intervention the most.  
An example of this dilemma was the negotiation and – in the end; lack of – implementation of the 
Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006. 
7.2. The Darfur Peace Agreement 
The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed in 2006, was the first attempt in which the government 
of Sudan participated in the process of coming up with a political solution to end the on-going mass 
atrocities. 
Already in the preamble to the DPA it is stated that the “sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity 
of the Sudan” is affirmed, indicating that the agreement, to a certain extent, takes its point of 
departure in the RtoP’s first pillar and prevailing pluralist line of thought.  
At the same time however, also in the preamble, it is stated: “all acts of violence against civilians 
and violations of human rights, and stressing full and unconditional acceptance of their obligations 
under International Humanitarian Law, international human rights law, and relevant UN Security 
Council Resolutions” (DPA, 2006:1).  
The agreement somewhat juxtaposes the premises with the importance of Sudan’s sovereignty, 
incorporated in the first paragraph under Fundamental Principles, Chapter 1: “The Republic of the 
Sudan is an independent, sovereign state; sovereignty is vested in the people and shall be exercised 
by the State in accordance with the provisions of the National Constitution into which this 
Agreement shall be incorporated.” (DPA, 2006:3). This would indicate an attempt to bridge the gap 
between what we in the theory presented as sovereignty and non-intervention or human rights and 
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justice. However, as we just stated that the government of Sudan was behind the mass atrocities in 
the Darfur region, it seems somewhat strange that the same government was also the central 
signatory of what was meant as the political solution to said mass atrocities.   
The RtoP norm combining human security and sovereignty is thus vivid already in the preamble 
and the first chapter; the state of Sudan firstly acknowledges its obligation to protect its own 
citizens and secondly, includes the external actors such as the UN as parts of the solution to the 
conflict in Darfur.  
The DPA did not succeed in ending the conflict though, amongst other things conceivably because 
it lacked support from some of the central rebel groups causing the violence in Darfur (ICRtoP). 
Mehari Taddele Maru26 points to the ease, with which the Sudanese government signed the DPA; 
“Lack of common negotiation ground by the Darfurians was smartly manipulated by the 
government of Sudan, who signed the DPA immediately” (Maru, 2007).  
This lack of ‘common negotiation ground’ was evident in the fact that representatives of the 
different cultural groups of Sudan were not invited to speak at the DPA negotiations – which also 
did take place in Nigeria and were not broadcasted to the people of Darfur. Two of the main rebel 
groups in the conflict ended up not being signatories, and arguably this is a major part of the reason 
behind the failure of the DPA. Mehari Taddele Maru even suggests, “The DPA (…) proved 
unsustainable. The other two rebel groups (…) SLA/M and (…) Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) did not sign the DPA. Both non-signatory rebel groups are more popular with the common 
Darfurians and the rebel commanders on the ground” (Maru, 2007). 
Further, Maru presents a central point to the failure of the DPA in relation to the lack of the rebel 
groups as signatories, namely that “the Darfurian rebel groups to remain the object and not the 
subject of the peace process” (Maru, 2007).  
So to sum up, the fact that the Sudanese government was thought representative for the people of 
Sudan – in following this also the people of Darfur – in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) does 
not seem logical, in the sense that they constitute as big a part of the conflict, as the parties who 
were not invited to be signatories. It can be concluded that the exclusion of the central rebel groups 
– and the technicalities of the negotiations taking place far from the people of Darfur – meant that 
there was a lack of the ownership needed in the Agreement for it to be implemented successfully.   
 
                                                        
26 Mehari Taddele Maru is former legal Expert at African Union Commission and Director for University Reform at Addis 
Ababa University. At the time when the article referred to was published in The Sudan Tribune, he was a postgraduate 
student at Harvard University. He holds M.Sc from University of Oxford (http://www.sudantribune.com/Lessons-from-the-
failure-of-Darfur,20975)  
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As previously stated, when the national government fails to protect its own people, the 
responsibility transfers to the international society.  
As the implementation of the DPA seemed gridlocked and as reports of mass atrocities in Darfur 
kept on surfacing in 2004, international society could no longer ignore the crisis. Nonetheless, it 
turned out that the response of the international society was not without hesitation, despite on-going 
RtoP negotiations on intervention taking much place in discourse leading up to the World Summit.  
This hesitation had several reasons. Below, we will shed light upon some more material 
understandings of the operationalization of the RtoP in Darfur. Even if national material interests do 
not play a vital part in the argument of this project, they are still not to be neglected: in this project 
so far, we have tried to combine the norms (structures) and actors, and the ideational must therefore 
also to some extent, be connected with the material to not only encompass the before-mentioned 
English School pluralism but also to give us an idea of ‘real politics’: 
 
The UK, the US and Canada were strong advocates of the RtoP norm, but several conditions were 
hampering an agreement on how to react to the Darfur crisis.  
Some postmodern states of the West had arguably suffered a loss of legitimacy as ‘powerful, 
influential actors’ after the invasion of Iraq, and it can be argued that it would have been hard for 
the Western countries to obtain support and legitimacy to design a strategy of intervention that 
would not have led to serious scrutiny and doubt from their domestic realm, as well as from the rest 
of international society (Williams, Bellamy, 2005: 36-38). Fostering this moral hesitation to act, 
Sudan’s government arguing for a protection of their juridical sovereignty made any intervention 
hard, as it would require a neglect of state consent; something, which would demand resources and 
coercive strategy from international society and especially, the postmodern states.  
Further, the US and other Western countries were hoping that the DPA would contribute to settling 
the disagreements and lay the foundation for peace building, as this agreement had been long (and 
costly) underways.  
The US in particular was reliant on oil and financial trade, intelligence-exchange and diplomacy 
with the government in Sudan. Also China and Russia were hoping for the DPA to settle matters 
peacefully, as they equally had interests of oil and arms trade (Badescu, Bergman, 2009: 294).  
Summing up, the strength and sovereignty of the Sudanese government and the importance of trade 
relations (and resources) with the regime, were important hampering preconditions. The RtoP was 
thus primarily hampered by the structures of world politics; “Global governance refers to collective 
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problem-solving arrangements (…) international cooperation where there is no global government, 
only states mostly pursuing their own national or regional interests.” (Thakur, 2011: 127).  
Because of the indeterminate nature of the RtoP norm, it seems that the interests of the states must 
be kept in mind, when continuing the analysis. As laid out in the quote above; when there is no 
global government – or determinate norm proscribing behaviour – the judgment process often falls 
out to be subjectively interpreted by the states of international society. 
7.3. The African Union Mission in Darfur (The AMIS) 
With the strong states of the international society hesitating and showing unwillingness at the time 
to act in Darfur, the AU was as the relevant regional organisation left with the prime responsibility.  
Whilst the AU’s decision to act in Darfur was not RtoP-related in first instance, but rather a 
consequence of the AU’s reformulated non-indifference policy, the paragraphs 138 and 139 later 
recognized the contributing efforts of regional organizations, whilst the AU was still present in 
Darfur (Badescu, Bergman, 2009: 295), and thus we choose to proceed with analysing AMIS in 
RtoP context. 
And so, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was operationalized in 2004, at a time when 
the rest of international society was preoccupied with other foreign policy priorities (Black and 
Williams, 2008: 16). AMIS was AU’s first big military intervention in conflict with one of its own 
members and it partly arose as a proof to the newly embraced non-indifference norm on human 
rights of the AU.  
AMIS was inevitably reliant on consent of the Sudanese government to deploy peacekeeping forces 
and so their main task was to monitor the ceasefire agreement of the DPA, rather than protecting the 
civilians. The latter, the AU had to recognize as being primarily the responsibility of the 
government of Sudan (Badescu, Bergman, 2009: 296-298). Ceasefire monitoring was thus the 
highest priority of the force, but as the DPA was not agreed upon by the neither JEM nor the faction 
of SLM/A, there was not much of a compliance to monitor.  
Thus, AMIS cannot be described as constituting a proper RtoP response to the crisis in Darfur, as it 
did not prioritize or even if, had mandate enough, to the protection of civilians. Further, the actors 
supporting the force including the UN, who advised and assisted the AU27, did little to challenge the 
legitimate sovereignty of the Sudanese state (Badescu, Bergman, 2009: 296).  
                                                        
27 As long as AMIS was a AU-led force, the UN could do little to support it by transferring ressources or troops, as 
UN’s assesed contribution budget, financing UN-led peace-keeping, cannot be undertaken by regional 
organizations (Badescu, Bergman, 2009: 298). 
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Finally, the AMIS mandate, not authorizing proactive protection of the civilians, but only 
intervention if the civilians were attacked in the presence of AMIS troops soon proved insufficient: 
the force of 7000 peacekeepers could not cover the 49,000 square kilometres of Darfur (Besada, 
2010:168), and when an attack in 2007 was conducted on AMIS troops, the vulnerability and 
inadequacy of the African troops stood clear (Badescu, Bergman, 2009: 299).  
So in sum, the AMIS was deployed at a time when the rest of the international society was 
preoccupied elsewhere. However, AMIS were only present in Sudan on the Sudanese states’ 
consent, and thus they could do little to prevent the mass atrocities, which au contraire, were present 
on the Sudanese states’ consent. Acting in accordance with its mandate, the AU was distrusted by 
some for being biased towards the actors who had signed the DPA. This was further highlighted by 
the fact that the mandate of AMIS obliged its peacekeepers to corporate with the Sudanese 
government; legitimizing the wrongdoer (Besada, 2010:167). This combined with the fact that the 
AU lacked the proper capacity needed to complete the mission, led to what is best described as a 
failure of the AMIS to protect the Darfurian people, and in the end, the conflict continuously 
escalated meanwhile the AMIS troops were (under)deployed in the region.  
 
7.3.1 The Postcolonial States 
When the AU assigned to the peacekeeping mission, responsibility was arguably left to those the 
least capable of carrying it, both financially and technically (Badescu, Bergman, 2009). 
‘Postcolonial dysfunction’ and operational problems highly dominated the AU’s approach to the 
conflict in Darfur, which led to a big blow on the post-colonial states’ highly ranked self-
determination.  
When donors and NGO’s further started turning their backs on AMIS due to the lack of results and 
accountability, and instead advocated a UN take-over, many AU officials perceived this as being 
“disrespectful, selfish, and short-sighted” (MacKinnon in Black and Williams, 2008:15). This accordingly 
led to an “antagonistic and uncooperative relationship between the two organizations” (Black and 
Williams, 2008:15).  
The notion of self-determination laid out as part of the postcolonial features, is thus evident in the 
postcolonial states’ somewhat hostile regard on postmodern interference, which is arguably 
perceived as a violation of the postcolonial states’ right to sovereignty. However, the AU still 
remained vastly dependent on support from the postmodern states throughout the deployment of 
forces, and summed up this contradictory situation very precisely portrays the postcolonial security 
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dilemma, set forth by Sørensen: “treat us as equals, but treat us as unequals”.  
7.4 The International Society’s Responsibility to Protect – From AMIS to UNAMID 
With the violence continuously escalating in the Darfur region, and the increasing inability for the 
AMIS to do anything about this, the AU itself in January 2006 requested that a UN force had to 
take over. 
The UNSC passed resolution 1679 on the basis of the RtoP commitment in resolution 1674, stating 
that concrete steps should be taken in order to transfer military operations in Darfur from AMIS to 
an UN-led mission. The resolution thus recalled paragraphs 138-139 on the RtoP and the protection 
of civilians in armed conflicts, and it became the first to ever do so in a country-specific situation 
(Matthews, 2008: 148-49)/(Resolution 1679).   
When the resolution was to be operationalized in August 2006 however, three UNSC members – 
China, Russia and Qatar (who at the time was one of the non-permanent 10) – abstained from 
voting. The abstinence of voting by China in particular, was based on the argument that an 
intervention in Sudan would not be legitimate without an incorporation of the fixed and 
standardized terms on deployments of UN missions: “with the consent of the Government of 
National Unity” (Resolution 1706). China’s interpretation of the paragraphs 138 and 139 thus remain 
unchallenged, and they seem to rest on the modern principle of sovereignty as bedrock for 
collective security and peace. 
Due to China’s prominent position, resolution 1706 of the UNSC thus invited the Sudanese 
government to comply with a UN mission (Badescu, Bergman, 2009: 301). Consent was though, never 
obtained from the Sudanese government, which argued that it would not allow another Iraq (Badescu, 
Bergman, 2009: 300)/(Matthews, 2008:149).  
The above example seems to indicate what was concluded in the previous chapter; that the 
modernizing states, based on their pluralist ontology, probably would interpret the RtoP as only 
viable through already existing practices of international law. Despite that the case of the mass 
atrocities in Darfur seems to constitute an obvious ‘RtoP text book’-example of the international 
society’s responsibility to intervene, the paragraphs endorsed have now shown to leave enough 
scope for interpretation to the modernizing states not needing to adhere to the essential framework 
of its existence. The UNSC’s reluctance to operationalize the RtoP, even after several official 
statements of failure of the Sudanese government to protect its own people, thus indicates the 
norm’s lack of legitimacy, and showcases the international society’s low risk of adopting the norm 
without consequences.  
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7.5. Resolution 1769 
When China and the US compromised on a hybrid mission between the AU and the UN on July 31st 
2007, in resolution 1769, the Sudanese government finally consented after much international 
pressure had been laid upon it (Matthews, 2008:149). Both the AU and Sudan demanded that the 
mission should have a dominantly African character though, clearly showcasing the notions of self-
determination and scepticism against the West (Badescu, Bergman, 2009: 300). Nonetheless, the 
resolution authorized a hybrid UN / AU 26,000-strong force deployment under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, to some extent finally showing the recognition of human security and justice being 
attached to collective security, as proposed by the RtoP framework. Also, the primary objective of 
UNAMID was civilian protection, rather than ceasefire monitoring and further, it was the first 
hybrid mission between the UN and a regional organization – seemingly adding new perspectives 
on whether the international society can act unified behind the norm of RtoP. 
  
However, the peacekeepers had no peace to keep and by 2008 the mission only encompassed 
15,400 out of the authorized 26,000. Furthermore, the UN Secretariat had generally awaited 
permission from Sudanese authorities on decisions regarding troop composition etc.; permissions 
making little sense in the light of the Sudanese government now being defined as ‘criminal’ under 
international law (Badescu, Bergman, 2009: 301). From July 2004, when the UN first imposed arms 
embargo on Sudan, to 2006 where the crisis in Darfur spilt over on neighbouring country Chad, it 
became clear that international diplomacy was focused more on ex, the DPA and maintaining bonds 
with the Sudanese government, than focusing on the actual killings, according to Roberto Belloni 
(Belloni, 2006: 340). The ad hoc-approach incorporated in the RtoP does thus, according to Belloni, 
allow the (major and minor) states of international to not intervene, when national interests are not 
harmed. Alex de Waal (2007: 1043-1054) highlights the same inadequacy of RtoP’s conceptualization 
in the paragraphs 138 and 139, but maintains that the norm of humanitarian intervention is only 
supposed to be applicable “in case-by-case” scenarios, anyways: military intervention in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have highlighted the limits to the ‘good’ of interventionist measures do, and it might 
thus be good that the RtoP is not limited to becoming a question of military intervention solely. 
 
So far we have proceeded with our analysis chronologically.  
Now we will go into a compilation of what we have learned so far about the different states’ 
responses to the operationalization of the RtoP principles in the conflict in Darfur. This will act as 
an inlet to our conclusion on this chapter. 
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7.6 Modernizing States 
Though socialization processes may have contributed to move China away from strictly pluralist 
notions towards more solidarist notions, its predominant pluralist stands is still found in its 
“strategy of norm containment” led in the adoption of the RtoP and the norm’s further role in the 
case of Darfur (Prantl and Nakano, 2011:214). China arguably managed to “deconstruct” the RtoP in a 
manner that fits the Chinese stand on the issue of sovereignty and non-intervention, especially by 
highlighting the state’s responsibility and the importance of state consent. An example of this 
strategy in the case of Darfur can be found in resolution 1556, which in the initial draft referred to 
specific sanctions. However, it was changed to the broader notion of referring to Article 41 of the 
UN charter1, due to pressure from the modern states (Williams and Bellamy, 2005:32). 
In the case of Darfur the “peculiar combination of dynamic development and static non-
development upon which they (the modern states) are based” (Sørensen, 2001:162) becomes quite 
evident. Though the modernizing states seem to share the classical security dilemmas of the modern 
state ideal type and thus take roles as guardians of sovereignty, they arguably find the accept of the 
international society of increasing importance. Hence, they  - through ‘pooling of interest’ – seek to 
modify originally postmodern solidarist norms such as humanitarian interventions, so that these do 
not violate their security dilemmas.  
7.7 Postmodern states 
Though the post-modern states accounted for the majority of the AMIS’ funding, they still seemed 
determined to maintain a status quo when it came to the mandate of the mission. This was even 
though that the International Crisis Group28 had argued, that doubling the personnel was necessary 
to achieve the aim of the AU; protecting the Dafurians (Crisis Group, 2005:12). It thus seemed, that the 
post-modern states had a shared goal of providing the AU with just enough funds, to make the 
mission seem credible (Black and Williams, 2008:17). 
Despite a bigger trust in UN expertise, the same issues seemed to be passed on to the AU/UN 
hybrid mission UNAMID, which equally to AMIS suffered the issues of a weak mandate, 
insufficient resources, and a general timidity when it came to providing the mission with troops. 
These issues caused, according to Black and Williams (2008:17) that all the post-modern states 
“punched below their financial weight” in the case of Darfur.      
                                                        
28 “The International Crisis Group is generally recognized as the world’s leading independent, non-partisan, 
source of analysis and advice to governments, and intergovernmental bodies like the United Nations, European 
Union and World Bank, on the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict”(Crisisgroup.org: About us) (?). 
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7.8 State Type Dilemmas, Challenges of RtoP and English Shool Considerations 
The conflict in Darfur was framed by continuing RtoP-language and discussions by international 
society on the new norm of humanitarian intervention. However, the response of international 
society to the conflict was highly based on compromises and actions showing the norm of non-
intervention being ranked equally or above the norm of humanitarian intervention. It can very well 
be argued, based on the examined resolutions, that none of the external actors present in Darfur 
(mainly the AU and the UN) would have been there without the Sudanese state’s consent. Instead 
international society continued to respect the authority and requirements of the Sudanese 
government, despite the referral of this to the ICC – arguably like this, legitimizing the state’s 
wrongdoing rather than undertaking the responsibility to act. A commitment to the RtoP framework 
containing a breach of sovereignty and non-intervention, and a following common course of action 
by international society did thus not take place, despite the referral of the Darfur conflict to Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, the pledged commitment to the paragraphs 138 and 139 and media and 
society shedding light on the mass atrocities continuously manifesting themselves in the region of 
Darfur. When examining the funding and capacities provided to the AMIS and UNAMID by 
international society, it can to some extent be said that they “represented symbolic measures that 
(…) allowed world leaders to claim that action was being taken…” (Badescu, Bergman, 2009: 302); 
meaning that lack of unified political will to challenge the sovereignty of Sudan showcases in the 
material responses of AMIS and UNAMID being clearly underfunded. The indeterminacy of the 
paragraphs thus affected the operational response to the conflict, being a response of compromise 
and disagreement.  
 
The paragraphs 138 and 139 make clear that all measures should be taken into account before a 
possible reaction. The Sudanese government clearly committed mass atrocities towards its people, 
and was unwilling and to some extent, also unable to consider and implement peace agreements. 
Reaction was thus possible, but as it is neither specified when nor how, and nor has any obligation 
in the paragraphs 138 and 139, it was clearly interpreted widely. In conclusion, no consensus 
showed when evolving the essential question related to humanitarian intervention in case of mass 
atrocities; the question of whether to break state sovereignty remained a barrier to any reaction of 
international society. The solidarist moral imperative of the RtoP – to react to human catastrophes – 
was thus embedded in pluralist reservations, practices and beliefs from the majority of states of 
international society.  
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7.9 Summing Up & Questionning 
The crisis in Darfur has been subject to much criticism and pessimism (Belloni, 2006)/(De Waal, 
2007)/(Badescu, Bergmann, 2009). Many have pointed at the failure of international society to act with 
military measures upon the RtoP commitment. It remains clear that military intervention was 
clearly not seen as the only ‘reactive’ way to live up to the RtoP in the case of Darfur (Badescu, 
Bergman, 2009: 303) and maybe for good reasons – as Thakur puts it (2007: 246) “the size of Sudan, the 
historical roots of the crisis, and the ease with which any Western intervention can be exploited as 
yet another assault on Arabs and Muslims, means that the prospect of a successful outcome of the 
use of unilateral military force are questionable” (military intervention would arguably have been 
led by Westerners or NATO). The postmodern states’ main moral argument for not intervening in 
humanitarian purposes was in Sørensen’s theory outlaid as when they are not able to justify lose 
over cause. It may be so, that loses in case of a unilateral intervention would have been very high.  
8. Overall Conclusion 
“Taking our point of departure in the different responses of the states of the international society to 
the question of how to operationalize the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in the case of the mass 
atrocities in the Darfur region, can we see indications of a developing international norm of 
humanitarian intervention?”  
 
Based on what we have learned throughout this project we find, that the paragraphs 138 and 139 of 
resolution 1674 have been endorsed by the states of the international society, which shows an 
indication of the emergence of an international norm of humanitarian intervention in case of mass 
atrocities. However, as we stated in the methodology chapter in the beginning of this project, we did 
not perceive this conclusion adequate to give a satisfactory perspective on whether we in fact see 
such a norm development. Looking further into the endorsement of the paragraphs, we found that 
the states involved in the process voiced significant demands of modification in order to unite 
behind the endorsement. This meant that the norm turned out quite indeterminate; it did not 
incorporate any demands of the states behind the norm, to back it up by action. The RtoP thus 
presents an increasing rising of the institution of human rights, but comes with great preservations 
for states’ individual manoeuvrability, which arguably indicates that the normative stand of 
international society in large is based on differing security concerns and much normative 
dissonance. 
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In order to determine whether the states endorsing the norm would in fact then also implement the 
norm of humanitarian intervention in case of mass atrocities in practice, we looked to the case of 
Darfur, the operationalization of the RtoP and the different states’ reactions towards it. In this case, 
we found profound disagreements between the different state types on whether and how to 
intervene. Especially the question of intervention without state consent came to hamper the 
implementation of the norm in practise, as non of the states who had endorsed the RtoP seemed 
willing to operationalize it, without the said consent. Despite that this unwillingness seemed varying 
in being determined by values or material concerns, it can be concluded that by prioritizing state 
consent in a situation where the state is the one part of the conflict seems counterproductive to the 
goal of the norm, namely to take action in cases of mass atrocities.  
 
Overall, we have found that we might be able to see indications of a continuingly developing 
institution of human rights and attached with it, solidarist values. However, the outmost 
operationalization of these normative ideals – the practice of humanitarian intervention, whilst 
might being on the way, is not yet here.  
 
8.1. Theoretical Conclusion 
We started this project attempting to reach understanding of some of the most fundamental 
structures of society, namely institutions. Based on Searle’s interpretation of institutions as anything 
that international society agrees to place collective intentional agreement on, there may have been 
an institutionalization of the norm of humanitarian intervention in cases of mass atrocities by the 
UN endorsement of the paragraphs 138 and 139. However, as this norm was specified as 
indeterminate and contested, it may indicate that the institution to which it belongs – arguably the 
one of human rights – is not as fundamental as or even juxtaposing to, the one of sovereignty. In the 
case of Darfur, the institution of sovereignty was thus by the states of international society 
perceived to presuppose any form of human justice. As we in contemporary society do not have a 
global government, and as normative dissonance and changing power balances seem to be 
prevailing in the secondary institution of the UN acting as the closest form we have of world 
governance, it will be hard to push any agenda beyond prevailing codes of behaviour. In this 
project, we have learned that correspondence between values, norms and practiced laws are vital if 
legitimacy and decisions are to be obtained. Thus any change of accepted conduct must essentially 
be pursued in the social practices embedding society.  
SIB 21.2   
Roskilde University   Group 9 
 
 70
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perspectivation and Critique 
This project has attempted to understand whether it is possible to talk about a recognized 
developing norm of humanitarian intervention, by looking at the different states of international 
society’s interpretation of the ‘responsibility to protect’ norm and its implementation to the mass 
atrocities in Darfur. To access this understanding of norms and institutions of international society 
as both constitutive and changing – and thus, as being both shaped by and shaping of states – we 
constructed a theoretical framework combining the fundamental epistemological and ontological 
foundation of the English School with Georg Sørensen’s midrange theory.  
 
However, several critiques of the English School’s methodology and epistemology can be set forth.  
Whilst we tried to compensate for what we perceived as the gravest inadequacy of the English 
School related to our chosen problem of examination, namely the school’s downplay of domestic 
differences and change among states, by introducing English Scholar Georg Sørensen’s statehood 
typology, most of the other critiques stem from other schools of international relations.  
The liberalists tend to emphasize the inadequacy of the English School in acknowledging domestic 
conditions, which might be of importance when ex, regarding the difference between democracies 
and non-democracies in their relation to peace; a concept the English School allegedly only can 
relate to through their ‘generalized’ Kantian-inspired world society.  
The school of International Political Economy highlights the English School’s inadequacy in its 
neglect of the significance of economic factors and third world dissimilarity.  
A Transnational critique on the school’s state-centrism can also be put up, as states do not from this 
viewpoint, necessarily monopolize public sphere in the globalized society (Jackson, Sørensen, 
2007: 153-155), and further, a Marxist critique would entail the English School’s justification of a 
constructed ideology of state sovereignty, thereby ignoring the moral responsibility of world society 
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(Jackson, Sørensen, 2007: 155), 
Last but not least, the Realist School of international relations emphasizes the failure of the English 
School by its theorizing; allowing norms and institutions, as large-scale structures, to be constitutive 
or even, shaping of state or ‘agency’ behavior in what is essentially a reality of anarchy.  
 
As the above shows, ontological divides bordering in their degree to either objectivism or 
subjectivism; materialism or ideationalism, have often dominated the field of international relations.  
Whilst epistemology might serve to divide the disciplines of international relations, we did not 
focus upon this in our project, but rather we chose to focus upon differing ontologies of 
international relations. It can be argued that politics and thus, international relations, essentially 
evolve around ontologies, which accordingly forms the fundamental debate of structure versus actor 
and the interrelatedness of this: how is the world and how should it be? Every ontology is arguably 
political, as every policy is arguably ontological. All theories presuppose a basic ontology. 
In this project, we searched to understand, among other things, the unifying and conflicting 
theoretical nature of the ‘responsibility to protect’. Epistemology and methodology was thus to 
some extent downplayed, as theories only conflict on ontology.  
We found boundaries between the domestic and the international realms, influencing politics, 
representing barriers to our analytical progress – therefore we encompassed a midrange theory. The 
social world cannot be understood exclusively in terms of ideas or materials, but can only be 
explained by the interplay of these: various levels of structures constitute and impinge identity, 
interests and options of agents etc.,, and as these again impinge and constitutes structures various 
levels of structures, the balance and interrelatedness between these is what must be of focus. 
 
In this project, we concluded that whilst the idea of a moral higher ground in case of mass atrocities 
seemed to board most states to commit to the ‘responsibility to protect’, the (geo)political reality in 
Darfur seemed to have had influence, as the commitment of international society proved difficult.  
In our examination of state types, it became clear that the states of international society differ in the 
extent to which they are reliant on either the material or the ideational. The vision that the state 
within international relations can exist in a structural environment that can be carefully separated 
from other realms, is in conclusion, an illusion. Developing countries seem to be more dependent 
on the material level, whereas postmodern countries are more relative from the material and can 
focus on the ideational. Thus differing ontologies does not only constitute theoretical debates, but 
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they also indicate the different structural logics at play in different parts of the world. We tried to 
encompass both the material and ideational elements in our real politics analysis of Darfur. 
However, we also acknowledged that the element of ‘change’ and the fact that each state structure 
is composed of the interplay of certain structural logics. States are not black boxes and “we should 
think not of international relations, but of global social relations”(Wight, 2006: 300). Which structure 
dominates a given practice is an empirical question though, which we can only attempt to indicate 
through theory. In the case of Darfur, it seemed to be the material. 
 (Wight, 2006: 290-300) 
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